My model is of this kind of cognitive failures is “motivated reasoning due to imprecise binding”.
(Though I like “slipperiness”, it’s nice and pithy).
My model is that the “outer edges” of words/concepts/heuristics are relatively large. The binding between A and B is not precise. The joint has slack in it.
And within that “box”, the outer edges of seeming reasonableness, there is some kind of internal heuristic or emotional-agent that is trying to “save face” or to make itself feel better or preserve its current belief system, using what slack or degrees of freedom it has to accomplish that, while typically remaining below the radar of conscious awareness.
I’m not sure if this explanation makes sense. Perhaps I am, in part, talking about a different kind of cognitive error.
My model is of this kind of cognitive failures is “motivated reasoning due to imprecise binding”.
(Though I like “slipperiness”, it’s nice and pithy).
My model is that the “outer edges” of words/concepts/heuristics are relatively large. The binding between A and B is not precise. The joint has slack in it.
And within that “box”, the outer edges of seeming reasonableness, there is some kind of internal heuristic or emotional-agent that is trying to “save face” or to make itself feel better or preserve its current belief system, using what slack or degrees of freedom it has to accomplish that, while typically remaining below the radar of conscious awareness.
I’m not sure if this explanation makes sense. Perhaps I am, in part, talking about a different kind of cognitive error.