Re Taiwan: I don’t think this serves as a counterargument. The remnants of the non-communist Kuomintang forces retreated to Taiwan as a last base. For mainland China to consider this a “left over territory to conquer which we didn’t complete in 1949” is historically and culturally more justifiable than what international foreign intervention usually means.
Re China’s internal despotism: China being not militaristically expansionist does not equal China being a humanistic society or desirable system of state or societal organization. However, being a controlling, despotic system with inward facing repression, also doesn’t falsify the introductory claim. Contrary to many other despotic states, China undoubtedly has the military capability to expand forcefully (and ironically probably enough indifference to human life to not care about the loss of armed personnel).
Re roads and belts initiative: I agree it is not just an infrastructure project. Quite the opposite: it is an effective mixture of soft- and hard-power (we develop your country without meddling in your internal affairs but we lock you into economic dependence on the way). It is however distinguishable from the way development aid by western countries has often played out for other countries’ elected governments.
All in all: China’s track record internally is much worse than western countries, judged against standard definitions of human rights. China’s track record externally is way better than western countries, judged against international law and human rights. We have to accept the ambiguity.
As to what happens if China aligns AGI first: can’t know obviously, but some aspects to consider.
Chinese communism had for the longest time a system of balanced, competing internal organizations. After the death of Mao I believe it was part of their success story, much as the two-term presidential limit in the US has been. It guaranteed change in leadership and thereby adaptation to new situations. This condition has changed with Xi Jinping. There is a probability that this also changes long-term certainties and stabilizing factors that contributed to China not being expansionist in a traditional way.
“Traditional way” is the trigger. Usage of AGI for dominance is anything but traditional. Might lead to a more flexible usage. My best bet would be: still not a war scenario, but rapidly increasing other nations’ dependence by exploiting vulnerabilities (and of course taking over Taiwan and claiming great portions of ocean if it hasn’t happened by then). It seems to fit best to the historic behaviour and the need for safety.
I believe there is no case to argue China’s AGI would be morally more or less desirable than a US version. If they align in any way to their country’s historic record, we are discussing trading a “golden prison with obvious brutal control” against “war machine with efficient but surgical internal control.”
Re the addendum: by 1895 the US track record for wars against established and independent neighbouring nations was already down the toilet.
To pick up some repeating arguments.
Re Taiwan: I don’t think this serves as a counterargument. The remnants of the non-communist Kuomintang forces retreated to Taiwan as a last base. For mainland China to consider this a “left over territory to conquer which we didn’t complete in 1949” is historically and culturally more justifiable than what international foreign intervention usually means.
Re China’s internal despotism: China being not militaristically expansionist does not equal China being a humanistic society or desirable system of state or societal organization. However, being a controlling, despotic system with inward facing repression, also doesn’t falsify the introductory claim. Contrary to many other despotic states, China undoubtedly has the military capability to expand forcefully (and ironically probably enough indifference to human life to not care about the loss of armed personnel).
Re roads and belts initiative: I agree it is not just an infrastructure project. Quite the opposite: it is an effective mixture of soft- and hard-power (we develop your country without meddling in your internal affairs but we lock you into economic dependence on the way). It is however distinguishable from the way development aid by western countries has often played out for other countries’ elected governments.
All in all: China’s track record internally is much worse than western countries, judged against standard definitions of human rights. China’s track record externally is way better than western countries, judged against international law and human rights. We have to accept the ambiguity.
As to what happens if China aligns AGI first: can’t know obviously, but some aspects to consider.
Chinese communism had for the longest time a system of balanced, competing internal organizations. After the death of Mao I believe it was part of their success story, much as the two-term presidential limit in the US has been. It guaranteed change in leadership and thereby adaptation to new situations. This condition has changed with Xi Jinping. There is a probability that this also changes long-term certainties and stabilizing factors that contributed to China not being expansionist in a traditional way.
“Traditional way” is the trigger. Usage of AGI for dominance is anything but traditional. Might lead to a more flexible usage. My best bet would be: still not a war scenario, but rapidly increasing other nations’ dependence by exploiting vulnerabilities (and of course taking over Taiwan and claiming great portions of ocean if it hasn’t happened by then). It seems to fit best to the historic behaviour and the need for safety.
I believe there is no case to argue China’s AGI would be morally more or less desirable than a US version. If they align in any way to their country’s historic record, we are discussing trading a “golden prison with obvious brutal control” against “war machine with efficient but surgical internal control.”
Re the addendum: by 1895 the US track record for wars against established and independent neighbouring nations was already down the toilet.