To say it another way, Eliezer, I share your intution that preferences that look silly over repeated trials are sometimes to be avoided. But I think they are not always to be avoided.
This sort of intution disagreement exists in other areas. Consider the intution that an act, X, is immoral if it cannot be universalized. This intution is often articulated as the objection “But what if everyone did X?”
Some people think this objection has real punch. Other people do not feel the punch at all, and simply reply, “But not everyone does X.”
Similarly, you think there is real punch in saying, “But what if you had that preference over repeated dealings?”
I do not feel the punch, and I can only reply, “But I do not have that preference over repeated dealings.”
To say it another way, Eliezer, I share your intution that preferences that look silly over repeated trials are sometimes to be avoided. But I think they are not always to be avoided.
This sort of intution disagreement exists in other areas. Consider the intution that an act, X, is immoral if it cannot be universalized. This intution is often articulated as the objection “But what if everyone did X?”
Some people think this objection has real punch. Other people do not feel the punch at all, and simply reply, “But not everyone does X.”
Similarly, you think there is real punch in saying, “But what if you had that preference over repeated dealings?”
I do not feel the punch, and I can only reply, “But I do not have that preference over repeated dealings.”