accelerationist has no reason to expect the doomer to save any money. And if the doomer does save it (plus enough extra to cover the doubled payback), they’ve effectively just locked up double the original capital until the end of the world
Couldn’t the doomer and accelerationist just agree that the doomer doesn’t have to pay until (e.g.) one year after the bet resolves? Then the doomer could spend all the money in anticipation of doom. If the doomer loses the bet, they can use the year after resolution to earn money to pay the accelerationist back.
(Of course there are extra practical difficulties here, like e.g. it might be hard for humans to earn money in the future. But I’m just talking about theoretical barriers.)
The bet still resolves at the same time. The doomer just has one year after resolution to get their bank balance back up from $0 so they can pay the accelerationist back.
Couldn’t the doomer and accelerationist just agree that the doomer doesn’t have to pay until (e.g.) one year after the bet resolves? Then the doomer could spend all the money in anticipation of doom. If the doomer loses the bet, they can use the year after resolution to earn money to pay the accelerationist back.
(Of course there are extra practical difficulties here, like e.g. it might be hard for humans to earn money in the future. But I’m just talking about theoretical barriers.)
I don’t see how this is different from just pushing the date of the bet back by one year?
The bet still resolves at the same time. The doomer just has one year after resolution to get their bank balance back up from $0 so they can pay the accelerationist back.