[Question] Is there an existing label for the category of fallacies exemplified by “paradox of tolerance”?

The “para­dox of tol­er­ance” is a con­tinu­ally hot topic, but I’ve not seen it framed as a mem­ber in a cat­e­gory of fal­la­cies where a prin­ci­ple is con­cep­tu­al­ized as ei­ther ab­solute or hyp­o­crit­i­cal and the ab­solute con­cep­tion then re­jected as self-con­tra­dic­tory or in­co­her­ent. Other ex­am­ples of com­monly ab­sol­u­tized prin­ci­ples are paci­fism, plu­ral­ism, hu­mil­ity, open­ness, spe­cific kinds of free­doms, etc.

I’ve been pro­vi­sion­ally call­ing it the ‘false self-con­tra­dic­tion fal­lacy’, mean­ing a spe­cial­ized case of black-and-white fal­lacy as ap­plied to eth­i­cal, moral or prac­ti­cal prin­ci­ples by pre­sum­ing a false di­chotomy be­tween the prin­ci­ple be­ing ei­ther ab­solute or hyp­o­crit­i­cal. The pre­sump­tion is based on a shal­low con­cep­tion of the prin­ci­ple that ex­cludes the deeper ground­ing prin­ci­ples that would al­low in­te­grat­ing re­stric­tions on the prin­ci­ple. The fal­lacy banks on the pop­u­lar in­tu­itions of jus­tice need­ing to be blind and the uni­ver­sal­ity of hu­man rights and pre­sumes limits to a prin­ci­ple to be ar­bi­trary or un­jus­tified.

Deeper con­cep­tions of prin­ci­ples are able to in­te­grate crit­i­cal re­jec­tion; for ex­am­ple, in the case of tol­er­ance, it can in­te­grate the self-preser­va­tion of the prin­ci­ple by con­di­tion­ing it on re­ciproc­ity. Tol­er­ance in this case is not valuable in it­self but as a higher-or­der ex­pres­sion of avoid­ing con­flict es­ca­la­tion, achiev­ing in­tel­lec­tual plu­ral­ity, etc.

Ab­solute paci­fism may be the most clear ex­am­ple of the fal­lacy, since most peo­ple un­der­stand that, to be co­her­ent, paci­fism must as­sign a high nega­tive value to vi­o­lence as a con­flict-solv­ing ap­proach and pos­i­tive value to al­ter­na­tive ap­proaches, but that vi­o­lence is still kept as the last re­sort, since the other ap­proaches can’t always work.

I find ‘false self-con­tra­dic­tions’ es­pe­cially per­ni­cious in their rhetor­i­cal per­sua­sive­ness and their con­se­quent wide ap­pli­ca­tion in pro­mot­ing moral rel­a­tivism and get­ting around in­con­ve­nient prin­ci­ples. I’m re­ally in­ter­ested in find­ing ex­ist­ing dis­course that would take a similar an­gle, and gen­er­ally in main­stream­ing aware­ness of this spe­cific kind of fal­la­cious ar­gu­men­ta­tion.