But condemning philosophers in this way is, I think, a bit like condemning theoretical physicists for not being experimental physicists.
The difference that is usually given is that unlike theoretical physicists, philosophers often don’t make falsifiable predictions. But a) at the limit the falsifiability of a theoretical scientist’s prediction is a nebulous affair (see, string theory for example) and b) philosophers rarely make claims regarding the outcome of single experiments—the analog to falsification for a philosophy is something like ‘conceptual irrelevance’. A philosophy is ‘falsified’ when the going scientific paradigm ceases to cohere with the philosophy.
I don’t ask for falsifiable experiments, I ask for reasonably narrow group acknowledgement of which things are more likely than others.
Just as physics has a limited set of acceptable beliefs at each scale of matter, and old ideas have been dropped, I’d hope to see philosophy in the same state. I too don’t see a difference in kind, but philosophy seems to have great difficulty as a group saying oops and shedding bad ideas.
This overly negative, almost reactionary attitude toward ‘things labeled philosophy instead of cognitive science’ does not seem likely to speed up the paradigm shift. A more proactive attitude that encouraged promising currents within philosophy departments would be more productive.
This is a criticism of expressions, not thoughts or even attitudes.
I don’t ask for falsifiable experiments, I ask for reasonably narrow group acknowledgement of which things are more likely than others.
Just as physics has a limited set of acceptable beliefs at each scale of matter, and old ideas have been dropped, I’d hope to see philosophy in the same state. I too don’t see a difference in kind, but philosophy seems to have great difficulty as a group saying oops and shedding bad ideas.
This is a criticism of expressions, not thoughts or even attitudes.