No, this is pretty much the standard LW orthodox response to the vast majority of philosophical problems—reductionism and mixed reference. I’m not saying that consciousness doesn’t exist, I’m saying that it’s nothing more than a kind of brain activity.
As far as I know, my position should not be surprising or novel in the least if you’ve read the sequences.
My favorite hypothesis for consciousness skepticism is the “colorblindness” theory (advocated by one of Yvain’s old profs, apparently). That is, just as some people cannot tell red from green, some people have a hard time with qualia.
Under this hypothesis, there are observable ramifications of a lack of (or difficulty with) qualia. Folks who have difficulty with qualia actually write about consciousness differently from folks with qualia. If you have qualia, you write like Chalmers. If you don’t, you write like Dennett (or the grandparent) :).
areyoufuckingkiddingme.jpg
No, this is pretty much the standard LW orthodox response to the vast majority of philosophical problems—reductionism and mixed reference. I’m not saying that consciousness doesn’t exist, I’m saying that it’s nothing more than a kind of brain activity.
As far as I know, my position should not be surprising or novel in the least if you’ve read the sequences.
My favorite hypothesis for consciousness skepticism is the “colorblindness” theory (advocated by one of Yvain’s old profs, apparently). That is, just as some people cannot tell red from green, some people have a hard time with qualia.
Under this hypothesis, there are observable ramifications of a lack of (or difficulty with) qualia. Folks who have difficulty with qualia actually write about consciousness differently from folks with qualia. If you have qualia, you write like Chalmers. If you don’t, you write like Dennett (or the grandparent) :).