I share something like this attitude, but in normal non-rigorous contexts I treat me-before-sleep and me-after-sleep as equally me in much the same way as you do me(expr1) and me(expr2).
More generally, my non-rigorous standard for “me” is such that all of my remembered states when I wasn’t sleeping, delirious, or younger than 16 or so unambiguously qualify for “me”dom, despite varying rather broadly amongst themselves. This is mostly because the maximum variation along salient parameters among that set of states seems significantly smaller than the minimum variations between that set and the various other sets of states I observe others demonstrating. (If I lived in a community seeded by copies of myself-as-of-five-minutes ago who could transfer memories among one another, I can imagine my notion of “I” changing radically.)
More generally, my non-rigorous standard for “me” is such that all of my remembered states when I wasn’t sleeping, delirious, or younger than 16 or so unambiguously qualify for “me”dom, despite varying rather broadly amongst themselves. This is mostly because the maximum variation along salient parameters among that set of states seems significantly smaller than the minimum variations between that set and the various other sets of states I observe others demonstrating. (If I lived in a community seeded by copies of myself-as-of-five-minutes ago who could transfer memories among one another, I can imagine my notion of “I” changing radically.)
Nice! I like that reasoning.
I personally experience a somewhat less coherent sense of self, and what sense of self I do experience seems particularly maladaptive to my environment, so we definitely seem to have different epistemological and pragmatic goals—but I think we’re applying very similar reasoning to arrive at our premises.
(nods) Fair enough.
I share something like this attitude, but in normal non-rigorous contexts I treat me-before-sleep and me-after-sleep as equally me in much the same way as you do me(expr1) and me(expr2).
More generally, my non-rigorous standard for “me” is such that all of my remembered states when I wasn’t sleeping, delirious, or younger than 16 or so unambiguously qualify for “me”dom, despite varying rather broadly amongst themselves. This is mostly because the maximum variation along salient parameters among that set of states seems significantly smaller than the minimum variations between that set and the various other sets of states I observe others demonstrating. (If I lived in a community seeded by copies of myself-as-of-five-minutes ago who could transfer memories among one another, I can imagine my notion of “I” changing radically.)
Nice! I like that reasoning.
I personally experience a somewhat less coherent sense of self, and what sense of self I do experience seems particularly maladaptive to my environment, so we definitely seem to have different epistemological and pragmatic goals—but I think we’re applying very similar reasoning to arrive at our premises.