Continuing the pattern of distribution of “better”-ness, 1⁄100,000 are 65536 times better than the median, and 1⁄1,000,000 are 4,294,967,276 times better than the median. If you have more than 10,000,000 soldiers then you likely have one that is 10^19 times better.
So the elites are the only ones that are meaningful for fighting your war. If the base rate of kidney donation is nonzero, they also immediately donate both their kidneys and die due to being 10^19 times more likely to donate kidneys. So the optimal strategy is to ensure that the base rate of kidney donation is zero.
This argument seems valid for large number of soldiers (~100,000). But when numbers are small, a different strategy should dominate. Perhaps forcing a uniform distribution of donating kidneys (by randomly forcing a solider to donate their kidney) could work better.
(The actual question is about your best utilitarian model, not your strategy given my model.)
Uniform distribution of donating kidney sounds also the result when a donor is 10^19 more likely to set the example. Maybe I should precise that the donor is unlikely to take the 1% risk unless someone else is more critical to war effort.
Continuing the pattern of distribution of “better”-ness, 1⁄100,000 are 65536 times better than the median, and 1⁄1,000,000 are 4,294,967,276 times better than the median. If you have more than 10,000,000 soldiers then you likely have one that is 10^19 times better.
So the elites are the only ones that are meaningful for fighting your war. If the base rate of kidney donation is nonzero, they also immediately donate both their kidneys and die due to being 10^19 times more likely to donate kidneys. So the optimal strategy is to ensure that the base rate of kidney donation is zero.
(I only thought for 1 minute.)
This argument seems valid for large number of soldiers (~100,000). But when numbers are small, a different strategy should dominate. Perhaps forcing a uniform distribution of donating kidneys (by randomly forcing a solider to donate their kidney) could work better.
(The actual question is about your best utilitarian model, not your strategy given my model.)
Uniform distribution of donating kidney sounds also the result when a donor is 10^19 more likely to set the example. Maybe I should precise that the donor is unlikely to take the 1% risk unless someone else is more critical to war effort.
Good laugh! But they’re also 10^19 times more likely to get the difference between donating one kidney and donating both.