Nick: oh, hey, cool, thanks. Didn’t know about the existance of such a FAQ
Yeah, the uniformity thing (which I thought of in terms of existance of structure in experience) does seem to be a hit against it, and something I’ve spent time thinking about, still without conclusion though.
On the other hand, the chain of reasoning leading to it seems hard to argue against.
ie, what would have to be true for for something like the dust theory to be false? I have trouble thinking of any way of having the dust theory be false and yet also keeping anything like zombies disallowed.
Incidentally, I note that the uniformity/structure problem is also, near as I can tell, a hit against Tegmark style “all possible mathematical structures” multiverse. (Actually, that is something I’m inclined to group together with Dust/Moravec cosmologies)
But, it seems to be that we end up with the same sort of problem with Boltzmann brains.
Why, near as I can tell, aren’t most of “me” (for any reasonably applicable reference class) made of Boltzmann brains or something analogous? (obviously, there would be some “me” that says the same thing even if the genuine majority of “me”s were such entities, but from my perspective, if the majority of me were such, finding that I’m experiencing something now, and continuing to experience, and not dying after a moment of awareness as a Boltzmann brain suggests that the majority of “me” isn’t such an entity. And you can presumably use the same argument on yourself to convince yourself that the “majority of you” isn’t either.)
Nick: oh, hey, cool, thanks. Didn’t know about the existance of such a FAQ
Yeah, the uniformity thing (which I thought of in terms of existance of structure in experience) does seem to be a hit against it, and something I’ve spent time thinking about, still without conclusion though.
On the other hand, the chain of reasoning leading to it seems hard to argue against.
ie, what would have to be true for for something like the dust theory to be false? I have trouble thinking of any way of having the dust theory be false and yet also keeping anything like zombies disallowed.
Incidentally, I note that the uniformity/structure problem is also, near as I can tell, a hit against Tegmark style “all possible mathematical structures” multiverse. (Actually, that is something I’m inclined to group together with Dust/Moravec cosmologies)
But, it seems to be that we end up with the same sort of problem with Boltzmann brains.
Why, near as I can tell, aren’t most of “me” (for any reasonably applicable reference class) made of Boltzmann brains or something analogous? (obviously, there would be some “me” that says the same thing even if the genuine majority of “me”s were such entities, but from my perspective, if the majority of me were such, finding that I’m experiencing something now, and continuing to experience, and not dying after a moment of awareness as a Boltzmann brain suggests that the majority of “me” isn’t such an entity. And you can presumably use the same argument on yourself to convince yourself that the “majority of you” isn’t either.)