I recall several years back Eliezer writing on these topics and at the time he saw this as a major stumbling block for functionalism. I would be interested in hearing how his thoughts have evolved, and I hope he can write about this soon.
Very, very strongly seconded.
Larry gives me another idea. Say the GLUT is implemented as a giant book with a person following instructions a la the Chinese Room. In the course of looking up the current (sentence, state) pair in the book, many other entries will inevitably impinge on the operator’s retinas and enter their mind, but not be reported. Do the experience-moments associated with them occur? Or say it’s implemented as a delay line memory that constantly cycles and discards entries until it reaches the current input, which it reports. Do the experience-moments associated with all the non-reported entries occur?
I recall several years back Eliezer writing on these topics and at the time he saw this as a major stumbling block for functionalism. I would be interested in hearing how his thoughts have evolved, and I hope he can write about this soon.
Very, very strongly seconded.
Larry gives me another idea. Say the GLUT is implemented as a giant book with a person following instructions a la the Chinese Room. In the course of looking up the current (sentence, state) pair in the book, many other entries will inevitably impinge on the operator’s retinas and enter their mind, but not be reported. Do the experience-moments associated with them occur? Or say it’s implemented as a delay line memory that constantly cycles and discards entries until it reaches the current input, which it reports. Do the experience-moments associated with all the non-reported entries occur?
(I have a feeling that’s a very Wrong Question.)