I think I may have lead us down the wrong path here. The ultimate question is the one of temporal discounting, and that question depends on how much we do/should value those post-singularity life years. If values can’t shift, then there isn’t really anything to talk about; you just ask yourself how much you value those years, and then move on. But if they can shift, and you acknowledge that they can, then we can discuss some thought experiments and stuff. It doesn’t seem important to discuss whether those shifts are due to discovering more about your pre-existing values, or due to actually changing those pre-existing values.
Haha, unfortunately you posed the question to the one guy out of 100 who would gladly answer “Absolutely”, followed by “What’s wrong with being an immature teenager?”
Ah, I see. You and I probably just have very different intuitions regarding what to value then, and I sense that thought experiments won’t bring us much closer.
Actually, I wonder what you think of this. Are you someone who sees death as a wildlyterriblething (I am)? If so, isn’t it because you place a correspondingly high value on the years of life you’d be losing?
The other is through value shift, along the lines of “I just ate a whole pizza and now that my food-craving brain-subassembly has shut up my value function consists mostly of concerns for my long-term health”. Even setting temporal discounting aside, I fail to see why your post-dinner-values should take precedence over your pre-dinner-values, or for that matter why deathbed-values should take precedence over teenage-values. They are both equally real moments of conscious experience.
In the pizza example, I think the value shift would moreso be along the lines of “I was prioritizing my current self too much relative to my future selves”. Presumably, post-dinner-values would be incorporating pre-dinner-self. Eg. it wouldn’t just say, “Screw my past self, my values are only about the present moment and onwards.” So I see your current set of values as being the most “accurate”, in which case regret minimization seems like it makes sense.
The ultimate question is the one of temporal discounting, and that question depends on how much we do/should value those post-singularity life years. If values can’t shift, then there isn’t really anything to talk about; you just ask yourself how much you value those years, and then move on. But if they can shift, and you acknowledge that they can, then we can discuss some thought experiments and stuff.
I think we’re getting closer to agreement as I’m starting to see what you’re getting at. My comment here would be that yes, your values can shift, and they have shifted after thinking hard about what post-Singularity life will be like and getting all excited. But the shift it has caused is a larger multiplier in front of the temporal discounted integral, not the disabling of temporal discounting altogether.
Actually, I wonder what you think of this. Are you someone who sees death as a wildlyterriblething (I am)?
Yes, but I don’t think there is any layer of reasoning beneath that preference. Evading death is just something that is very much hard-coded into us by evolution.
In the pizza example, I think the value shift would moreso be along the lines of “I was prioritizing my current self too much relative to my future selves”. Presumably, post-dinner-values would be incorporating pre-dinner-self.
I don’t think that’s true. Crucially, there is no knowledge being gained over the course of dinner, only value shift. It’s not like you didn’t know beforehand that pizza was unhealthy, or that you will regret your decision. And if post-dinner self does not take explicit steps to manipulate future value, the situation will repeat itself the next day, and the day after, and so on for hundreds of times.
I think we’re getting closer to agreement as I’m starting to see what you’re getting at. My comment here would be that yes, your values can shift, and they have shifted after thinking hard about what post-Singularity life will be like and getting all excited. But the shift it has caused is a larger multiplier in front of the temporal discounted integral, not the disabling of temporal discounting altogether.
I’m in agreement here! Some follow up questions: what are your thoughts on how much discounting should be done? Relatedly, what are your thoughts on how much we should value life? Is it obvious that past eg. 500 years, it’s far enough into the future that it becomes negligible? If not, why aren’t these things that are discussed? Also, do you share my impression that people (on LW) largely assume that life expectancy is something like 80 years and life is valued at something like $10M?
Yes, but I don’t think there is any layer of reasoning beneath that preference. Evading death is just something that is very much hard-coded into us by evolution.
Regardless of whether it stems from a layer of reasoning or whether it is hard-coded, doesn’t it imply that you aren’t doing too much temporal discounting? If you did a lot of temporal discounting and didn’t value the years beyond eg. 250 years old very much, then death wouldn’t be that bad, right?
I think I may have lead us down the wrong path here. The ultimate question is the one of temporal discounting, and that question depends on how much we do/should value those post-singularity life years. If values can’t shift, then there isn’t really anything to talk about; you just ask yourself how much you value those years, and then move on. But if they can shift, and you acknowledge that they can, then we can discuss some thought experiments and stuff. It doesn’t seem important to discuss whether those shifts are due to discovering more about your pre-existing values, or due to actually changing those pre-existing values.
Ah, I see. You and I probably just have very different intuitions regarding what to value then, and I sense that thought experiments won’t bring us much closer.
Actually, I wonder what you think of this. Are you someone who sees death as a wildly terrible thing (I am)? If so, isn’t it because you place a correspondingly high value on the years of life you’d be losing?
In the pizza example, I think the value shift would moreso be along the lines of “I was prioritizing my current self too much relative to my future selves”. Presumably, post-dinner-values would be incorporating pre-dinner-self. Eg. it wouldn’t just say, “Screw my past self, my values are only about the present moment and onwards.” So I see your current set of values as being the most “accurate”, in which case regret minimization seems like it makes sense.
I think we’re getting closer to agreement as I’m starting to see what you’re getting at. My comment here would be that yes, your values can shift, and they have shifted after thinking hard about what post-Singularity life will be like and getting all excited. But the shift it has caused is a larger multiplier in front of the temporal discounted integral, not the disabling of temporal discounting altogether.
Yes, but I don’t think there is any layer of reasoning beneath that preference. Evading death is just something that is very much hard-coded into us by evolution.
I don’t think that’s true. Crucially, there is no knowledge being gained over the course of dinner, only value shift. It’s not like you didn’t know beforehand that pizza was unhealthy, or that you will regret your decision. And if post-dinner self does not take explicit steps to manipulate future value, the situation will repeat itself the next day, and the day after, and so on for hundreds of times.
I’m in agreement here! Some follow up questions: what are your thoughts on how much discounting should be done? Relatedly, what are your thoughts on how much we should value life? Is it obvious that past eg. 500 years, it’s far enough into the future that it becomes negligible? If not, why aren’t these things that are discussed? Also, do you share my impression that people (on LW) largely assume that life expectancy is something like 80 years and life is valued at something like $10M?
Regardless of whether it stems from a layer of reasoning or whether it is hard-coded, doesn’t it imply that you aren’t doing too much temporal discounting? If you did a lot of temporal discounting and didn’t value the years beyond eg. 250 years old very much, then death wouldn’t be that bad, right?