Let me see if I understand your argument correctly: UDT works by converting all beliefs about facts into their equivalent value expressions (due to fact/value equivalence), and chooses the optimal program for maximizing expected utility according to those values.
So, if you were to program a robot such that it adheres to the decisions output by UDT, then this robot, when acting, can be viewed as simply adhering to a programmer-fed ruleset. That ruleset does not explicitly use desirability of any consequence as a desideratum when deciding what action to output, and the ruleset can be regarded as the robot’s judgment of “what is right”. Because it does “what is right” irrespective of the consequences (esp. in its particular location in time/space/world), its moral judgments match those of a deontologist.
I think that’s about right. Your next question might be, “How does this make a UDT agent different from any other?” I address that question in this reply to Wei Dai.
Thanks! Turns out I correctly guessed your answer to that question too! (I noticed the distinction between the programmer’s goals and [what the agent regards as] the agent’s goals, but hadn’t mentioned that explicitly in my summary.)
Doesn’t sound too unreasonable to me… I’ll think about it some more.
Edit: Do you think it would be a good idea to put (a modified version of) my summary at the top of your article?
Let me see if I understand your argument correctly: UDT works by converting all beliefs about facts into their equivalent value expressions (due to fact/value equivalence), and chooses the optimal program for maximizing expected utility according to those values.
So, if you were to program a robot such that it adheres to the decisions output by UDT, then this robot, when acting, can be viewed as simply adhering to a programmer-fed ruleset. That ruleset does not explicitly use desirability of any consequence as a desideratum when deciding what action to output, and the ruleset can be regarded as the robot’s judgment of “what is right”. Because it does “what is right” irrespective of the consequences (esp. in its particular location in time/space/world), its moral judgments match those of a deontologist.
Does that about get it right?
I think that’s about right. Your next question might be, “How does this make a UDT agent different from any other?” I address that question in this reply to Wei Dai.
Thanks! Turns out I correctly guessed your answer to that question too! (I noticed the distinction between the programmer’s goals and [what the agent regards as] the agent’s goals, but hadn’t mentioned that explicitly in my summary.)
Doesn’t sound too unreasonable to me… I’ll think about it some more.
Edit: Do you think it would be a good idea to put (a modified version of) my summary at the top of your article?