This sounds like a good way to avoid the heavyweight problems with all the consciousness debates, so it seems like a good idea.
However, it retains the problem of defining “morality”, which is still unresolved. UCMAists will argue from theories of morality where UC is an element of the theory, while E.Y. already assumes a different metaethics where there is no clear boundaries of human “morality” and where morality-in-the-way-we-understand-it is a feature of humans exclusively, and other things might have things akin to morality that are not morality, and some minds would be able to evaluate moral behaviors without caring about morality in the slightest, while some other minds we might consider morally-important and yet would completely ignore any “UCMA” that would otherwise compel any human.
This sounds like a good way to avoid the heavyweight problems with all the consciousness debates, so it seems like a good idea.
However, it retains the problem of defining “morality”, which is still unresolved. UCMAists will argue from theories of morality where UC is an element of the theory, while E.Y. already assumes a different metaethics where there is no clear boundaries of human “morality” and where morality-in-the-way-we-understand-it is a feature of humans exclusively, and other things might have things akin to morality that are not morality, and some minds would be able to evaluate moral behaviors without caring about morality in the slightest, while some other minds we might consider morally-important and yet would completely ignore any “UCMA” that would otherwise compel any human.