That’s what I mean—a non-negligible chance. If your estimation of the likelihood of God is negligible, then it may as well be zero. I don’t think that there is an overwhelming weight of evidence toward either case, and I don’t think this is something that science can resolve.
If your estimation of the likelihood of God is negligible, then it may as well be zero.
This doesn’t follow. For example, if you recite to me a 17 million digit number, my estimate that it is a prime is about 1 in a million by the prime number theorem. But, if I then find out that the number was in fact 2^57,885,161 −1, my estimate for it being prime goes up by a lot. So one can assign very small probabilities to things and still update strongly on evidence.
So, you’re saying that in your view no atheist could possibly take the question of the truth of religion seriously? Or, alternately, that one could be an atheist but still give a large probability of God’s existence? Both of these seem a bit bizarre...
That’s what I mean—a non-negligible chance. If your estimation of the likelihood of God is negligible, then it may as well be zero. I don’t think that there is an overwhelming weight of evidence toward either case, and I don’t think this is something that science can resolve.
This doesn’t follow. For example, if you recite to me a 17 million digit number, my estimate that it is a prime is about 1 in a million by the prime number theorem. But, if I then find out that the number was in fact 2^57,885,161 −1, my estimate for it being prime goes up by a lot. So one can assign very small probabilities to things and still update strongly on evidence.
Why not?
So, you’re saying that in your view no atheist could possibly take the question of the truth of religion seriously? Or, alternately, that one could be an atheist but still give a large probability of God’s existence? Both of these seem a bit bizarre...