For a true Bayesian, it is impossible to seek evidence that confirms a theory. There is no possible plan you can devise, no clever strategy, no cunning device, by which you can legitimately expect your confidence in a fixed proposition to be higher (on average) than before. You can only ever seek evidence to test a theory, not to confirm it.
Old post, but isn’t evidence that disconfirms the theory X equal to confirming ~X? Is ~X ineligible to be considered a theory?
Everything in that quote applies just as much to disconfirming a theory as it does to confirming a theory. Conservation of expected evidence means that you cannot legitimately expect your confidence in a theory to go down either.
Old post, but isn’t evidence that disconfirms the theory X equal to confirming ~X? Is ~X ineligible to be considered a theory?
Everything in that quote applies just as much to disconfirming a theory as it does to confirming a theory. Conservation of expected evidence means that you cannot legitimately expect your confidence in a theory to go down either.