But you can’t have it both ways—as a matter of probability theory, not mere fairness.
You’ve proved your case—but there’s still enough wriggle room that it won’t make much practical difference. One example from global warming, which predicts higher temperature on average in Europe—unless it diverts the gulf stream, in which case it predicts lower average temperatures. Consider the two statements:
1) If average temperatures go up in Europe, or down, this is evidence for global warming.
2) If average temperatures go up in Europe, and the gulf stream isn’t diverted, or average temperatures go down, while the gulf stream is diverted, this is evidence of global warming.
1) is nonsense, 2) is true. Lots of people say statements that sound like 1), when they mean something like 2). Add an extra detail, and the symmetry is broken.
This weakens the practical power of your point; if an accused witch is afraid, that shows she’s guilty; if she’s not afraid, in a way which causes the inquisitor to be suspicious, she’s also guilty. That argument is flawed, but it isn’t a logical flaw (since the similar statement 2) is true).
Then we’re back to arguing the legitimacy of these “extra details”.
But you can’t have it both ways—as a matter of probability theory, not mere fairness.
You’ve proved your case—but there’s still enough wriggle room that it won’t make much practical difference. One example from global warming, which predicts higher temperature on average in Europe—unless it diverts the gulf stream, in which case it predicts lower average temperatures. Consider the two statements: 1) If average temperatures go up in Europe, or down, this is evidence for global warming. 2) If average temperatures go up in Europe, and the gulf stream isn’t diverted, or average temperatures go down, while the gulf stream is diverted, this is evidence of global warming.
1) is nonsense, 2) is true. Lots of people say statements that sound like 1), when they mean something like 2). Add an extra detail, and the symmetry is broken.
This weakens the practical power of your point; if an accused witch is afraid, that shows she’s guilty; if she’s not afraid, in a way which causes the inquisitor to be suspicious, she’s also guilty. That argument is flawed, but it isn’t a logical flaw (since the similar statement 2) is true).
Then we’re back to arguing the legitimacy of these “extra details”.