Similarly, we’ve shown that we can’t be trusted to do things like promise not to further expand NATO, because we lack the ability to keep commitments that are no longer seen as in our interest in the face of pressure.
The US and NATO did not promise not to further expand NATO. Certain officials may have promised this, and those officials were out of power by the time NATO actually expanded. There’s an established procedure by which governments make promises to other states that are considered binding on future governments of the same state; it’s called a treaty, and this procedure was not used. When someone makes a promise to you, you have no reason to expect that whoever takes their job after they retire will follow through on that promise, unless they made the promise in the form of a contract on behalf of their employer.
This simply kicks the buck to the question of why the US (and other countries) seem reluctant in general to make long-lasting treaties, and the answer to that question still seems pretty clearly some form of “lack of ability (desire) to keep (make) commitments that are (will be) no longer seen as in our interest in the face of pressure”.
Also, I would argue that the Trump administration did in fact significantly weaken the US’ credibility even on the holding-up-existing-commitments front, what with their treatment of various agreements like NAFTA or the Trans-Pacific Partnership; this shows fairly starkly that even agreements that are supposed to bind future iterations of the same government do not in fact do so, which in turn implies that there is no real mechanism to make those kinds of promises at all, regardless of whether you call them “treaties”, “agreements”, “pacts”, or what have you.
Unlike Zvi, I am less inclined to treat this as anyone’s fault in particular; it certainly isn’t just unique to the US. But it is an unfortunate consequence of the way humans, even (especially?) humans in power, seem to implement CDT by default (and an extremely myopic version of CDT at that). I don’t think it’s a stretch to argue smarter agents would do better here.
the US (and other countries) seem reluctant in general to make long-lasting treaties
What makes you say that?
I agree to some extent about Trump’s treatment of agreements damaging US credibility, but even then, I’m not sure if the US explicitly violated any treaties under Trump (not NAFTA, which was replaced by agreement of all parties, or the TPP, which the US never ratified. Perhaps the Iran nuclear deal? I’m not clear on what the legal status of the US’s withdrawl was).
The mechanism to make these kinds of promises is the desire of people with influence over a country’s decisions to maintain that country’s credibility. (This is broader than just people who have final say over a decision, since other political actors can often exert pressure on them). This isn’t an airtight mechanism, sure, but it works to some extent. If you’re trying to imply that it’s on no firmer ground than the promises made by US negotiators to Gorbechev in 1990, then that’s not true at all. In order for a country to be swayed at all by promises previous leaders have made, a necessary prerequisite is for its current leaders to have some way to be aware that previous promises have been made. A private conversation between past leaders, with a transcript that’s classified at the time decisions violating promises made in said conversation are made, doesn’t cut it.
The US and NATO did not promise not to further expand NATO. Certain officials may have promised this, and those officials were out of power by the time NATO actually expanded. There’s an established procedure by which governments make promises to other states that are considered binding on future governments of the same state; it’s called a treaty, and this procedure was not used. When someone makes a promise to you, you have no reason to expect that whoever takes their job after they retire will follow through on that promise, unless they made the promise in the form of a contract on behalf of their employer.
This simply kicks the buck to the question of why the US (and other countries) seem reluctant in general to make long-lasting treaties, and the answer to that question still seems pretty clearly some form of “lack of ability (desire) to keep (make) commitments that are (will be) no longer seen as in our interest in the face of pressure”.
Also, I would argue that the Trump administration did in fact significantly weaken the US’ credibility even on the holding-up-existing-commitments front, what with their treatment of various agreements like NAFTA or the Trans-Pacific Partnership; this shows fairly starkly that even agreements that are supposed to bind future iterations of the same government do not in fact do so, which in turn implies that there is no real mechanism to make those kinds of promises at all, regardless of whether you call them “treaties”, “agreements”, “pacts”, or what have you.
Unlike Zvi, I am less inclined to treat this as anyone’s fault in particular; it certainly isn’t just unique to the US. But it is an unfortunate consequence of the way humans, even (especially?) humans in power, seem to implement CDT by default (and an extremely myopic version of CDT at that). I don’t think it’s a stretch to argue smarter agents would do better here.
What makes you say that?
I agree to some extent about Trump’s treatment of agreements damaging US credibility, but even then, I’m not sure if the US explicitly violated any treaties under Trump (not NAFTA, which was replaced by agreement of all parties, or the TPP, which the US never ratified. Perhaps the Iran nuclear deal? I’m not clear on what the legal status of the US’s withdrawl was).
The mechanism to make these kinds of promises is the desire of people with influence over a country’s decisions to maintain that country’s credibility. (This is broader than just people who have final say over a decision, since other political actors can often exert pressure on them). This isn’t an airtight mechanism, sure, but it works to some extent. If you’re trying to imply that it’s on no firmer ground than the promises made by US negotiators to Gorbechev in 1990, then that’s not true at all. In order for a country to be swayed at all by promises previous leaders have made, a necessary prerequisite is for its current leaders to have some way to be aware that previous promises have been made. A private conversation between past leaders, with a transcript that’s classified at the time decisions violating promises made in said conversation are made, doesn’t cut it.