I cooperate with the Paperclipper if I think it will one-box on Newcomb’s Problem with myself as Omega.
This strategy would apply to the first round. For the iterated game, would you thereafter apply Tit for tat?
The strategy applies to every round equally, if the Paperclipper is in fact behaving as I expect. If the Paperclipper doesn’t behave as I expect, the strategy is unuseful, and I might well switch to Tit for Tat.
The strategy applies to every round equally, if the Paperclipper is in fact behaving as I expect. If the Paperclipper doesn’t behave as I expect, the strategy is unuseful, and I might well switch to Tit for Tat.
I will one-box on Newcomb’s Problem with you as Omega. As in, I really will. That’s what I think the right thing to do is.
Would you care to play a round of high-stakes prisoner’s dilemma?