What you’re proposing sounds more like moral relativism than moral nihilism.
I think that you’re confusing moral universalism with moral absolutism and value monism. If a particular individual values eating ice cream and there are no consequences that would conflict with other values of this individual for eating ice cream in these particular circumstances, then it is moral for that individual to eat ice cream, and I do not believe that it makes sense to say that it is not meaningful to say that it is true that it is moral for this individual to eat ice cream in these circumstances. This does not mean that there is some objective reason to value eating ice cream or that regardless of the individual or circumstances that it is true that it is moral to eat ice cream. The sense in which morality is universal is not on the level of actions or values, but on the level of utility maximization, and the sense in which it is objective is that it is not whatever you want it to be.
What you’re proposing sounds more like moral relativism than moral nihilism.
Ah, yes. My mistake. I stand corrected. Some cursory googling suggests that you are right. With that said, to me Moral Nihilism seems like a natural consequence of Moral Relativism, but that may be a fact about me and not the universe, so to speak (though I would be grateful if you could point out a way to be morally relativist without morally nihilist).
I think that you’re confusing moral universalism with moral absolutism and value monism.
The last paragraph of my previous post was a claim that unless you an objective way of ordering conflicting preferences (and I don’t see how you can), you are forced to work under value pluralism. I did use this as an argument against moral universalism , though that argument may not be entirely correct. I concede the point.
What you’re proposing sounds more like moral relativism than moral nihilism.
I think that you’re confusing moral universalism with moral absolutism and value monism. If a particular individual values eating ice cream and there are no consequences that would conflict with other values of this individual for eating ice cream in these particular circumstances, then it is moral for that individual to eat ice cream, and I do not believe that it makes sense to say that it is not meaningful to say that it is true that it is moral for this individual to eat ice cream in these circumstances. This does not mean that there is some objective reason to value eating ice cream or that regardless of the individual or circumstances that it is true that it is moral to eat ice cream. The sense in which morality is universal is not on the level of actions or values, but on the level of utility maximization, and the sense in which it is objective is that it is not whatever you want it to be.
Ah, yes. My mistake. I stand corrected. Some cursory googling suggests that you are right. With that said, to me Moral Nihilism seems like a natural consequence of Moral Relativism, but that may be a fact about me and not the universe, so to speak (though I would be grateful if you could point out a way to be morally relativist without morally nihilist).
The last paragraph of my previous post was a claim that unless you an objective way of ordering conflicting preferences (and I don’t see how you can), you are forced to work under value pluralism. I did use this as an argument against moral universalism , though that argument may not be entirely correct. I concede the point.