Extraordinary affirmations need extraordinary evidence
You’re not gonna like this, but that’s another one that’s not actually true at all. Extraordinary theories have often been proven with mundane evidence, evidence that had been sitting around in front of our faces for decades or centuries, the new theory, the extraordinary claim, only became apparent after this mundane evidence was subjected to original kinds of analysis, new arguments, arguably complicated arguments. Although new evidence was usually gathered to test the theory, it wasn’t strictly needed. If it had been impossible to go out into the world and subject the theory to new tests (as it is for the simulation hypothesis), the truth of the theory still would have become obvious. Examples of such theories include plate tectonics, heliocentrism, and evolution.
To be honest, my impression is that we rationalists were very happy with this principle when Dawkins used it against the God hypothesis in The God Delusion
I was very happy with it back then, because I was just a kid. I hadn’t learned how scientific thinking (actual, not performative) really ought to work. I trusted the accounts of those who were busy doing science, not realising that using a particular frame doesn’t always equip a person to question the frame or to develop better frames when that one starts to reach its limits.
not only pure K-description but also logical depth, speed prior, or Levin’s complexity
Does this universe really look to you like it conforms to a speed prior? This universe doesn’t care at all about runtime. (it can indeed only be simulated very lossily) (one of the only objections I still take seriously, is that subjects within a lossy simulation of a universe, optimised for answering certain questions which don’t closely concern the minutia of their thoughts, might have far lower experiential-measure than actual physical people, so perhaps although they are far more numerous than natural people, it may still work out to be unlikely to be one of them.)
I could say more about the rest of that, but it doesn’t really matter whether we believe the simulation hypothesis today.
You’re not gonna like this, but that’s another one that’s not actually true at all. Extraordinary theories have often been proven with mundane evidence, evidence that had been sitting around in front of our faces for decades or centuries, the new theory, the extraordinary claim, only became apparent after this mundane evidence was subjected to original kinds of analysis, new arguments, arguably complicated arguments. Although new evidence was usually gathered to test the theory, it wasn’t strictly needed. If it had been impossible to go out into the world and subject the theory to new tests (as it is for the simulation hypothesis), the truth of the theory still would have become obvious. Examples of such theories include plate tectonics, heliocentrism, and evolution.
I was very happy with it back then, because I was just a kid. I hadn’t learned how scientific thinking (actual, not performative) really ought to work. I trusted the accounts of those who were busy doing science, not realising that using a particular frame doesn’t always equip a person to question the frame or to develop better frames when that one starts to reach its limits.
Does this universe really look to you like it conforms to a speed prior? This universe doesn’t care at all about runtime. (it can indeed only be simulated very lossily) (one of the only objections I still take seriously, is that subjects within a lossy simulation of a universe, optimised for answering certain questions which don’t closely concern the minutia of their thoughts, might have far lower experiential-measure than actual physical people, so perhaps although they are far more numerous than natural people, it may still work out to be unlikely to be one of them.)
I could say more about the rest of that, but it doesn’t really matter whether we believe the simulation hypothesis today.