Basically, as Vaniver says, all good DTs pretty much agree on this. TDT, CDT and EDT all agree that if you have common knowledge of a sufficient number of other people using the same decision theory (or, with more complicated calculations, various possible theories including those three) are interested in the book, you should all donate. This common knowledge, however, is usually the extremely costly, high-information-value part—the part about figuring out whether to donate or not seems trivial by comparison.
I don’t think this is correct. The CDT agents would all agree that they all should donate and would support the implementation of a simple mutual commitment protocol. If they couldn’t arrange a way to compel each other to not defect on the commons problem they would be sad but defect themselves. Fortunately there are already existent online donation systems are sufficient. You just need one of the ones that returns pledged funds if the target goal isn’t met and a carefully calculated target goal.
At the extremes of perfect CDT agents you’d have to fiddle with the details a little more and, for example, make it forbidden for one agent to donate twice in order to allow that any will even donate once. But we can assume either all those details are handled or the CDT agents aren’t quite that ridiculous and consider the precommitment mechanism adequate. Another thing they would do is arrange a taxation system enforced by people with guns with the relevant commons problems to be solved specified by (necessarily compulsory) voting.
Of course, the other thing groups of CDT agents would do is arrange a free market capitalism system wherein products are payed for and people who don’t pay don’t get the stuff. A more efficient system would also allow the author easy access to a loan based on the awareness of the loan giver of the desire for the books. Then she would actually get most of the money from the sales of said books.
A more efficient system would also allow the author easy access to a loan based on the awareness of the loan giver of the desire for the books. Then she would actually get most of the money from the sales of said books.
Right- where again the primary block is the mutual information required.
I don’t think this is correct. The CDT agents would all agree that they all should donate and would support the implementation of a simple mutual commitment protocol. If they couldn’t arrange a way to compel each other to not defect on the commons problem they would be sad but defect themselves. Fortunately there are already existent online donation systems are sufficient. You just need one of the ones that returns pledged funds if the target goal isn’t met and a carefully calculated target goal.
At the extremes of perfect CDT agents you’d have to fiddle with the details a little more and, for example, make it forbidden for one agent to donate twice in order to allow that any will even donate once. But we can assume either all those details are handled or the CDT agents aren’t quite that ridiculous and consider the precommitment mechanism adequate. Another thing they would do is arrange a taxation system enforced by people with guns with the relevant commons problems to be solved specified by (necessarily compulsory) voting.
Of course, the other thing groups of CDT agents would do is arrange a free market capitalism system wherein products are payed for and people who don’t pay don’t get the stuff. A more efficient system would also allow the author easy access to a loan based on the awareness of the loan giver of the desire for the books. Then she would actually get most of the money from the sales of said books.
Right- where again the primary block is the mutual information required.