It can be found (for example) here, pp 12-13. A higher quality but paywalled PDF is here.
The point Jaynes is making is that it does not matter what the stopping rule is. Once the data are obtained, the experimenter’s state of mind is irrelevant to what the data imply about the phenomenon under study.
“Bayesian inference will not get us into this absurd situation, because it perceives automatically what common sense demands; that what is relevant for this inference is not the
relative probabilities of imaginary data sets which were not observed, but the relative likelihoods of different parameter values, based on the one real data set which was observed;
and this is the same for all the experimenters.”
It can be found (for example) here, pp 12-13. A higher quality but paywalled PDF is here.
The point Jaynes is making is that it does not matter what the stopping rule is. Once the data are obtained, the experimenter’s state of mind is irrelevant to what the data imply about the phenomenon under study.
“Bayesian inference will not get us into this absurd situation, because it perceives automatically what common sense demands; that what is relevant for this inference is not the relative probabilities of imaginary data sets which were not observed, but the relative likelihoods of different parameter values, based on the one real data set which was observed; and this is the same for all the experimenters.”