How should we respond to the possibility that the universe actually has infinite value? Does it mean that we have no reason to do any action (because we don’t increase the sum total of value in the world)? Or does this possibility refute aggregative consequentialism?
Neither. It is possible that action A results in the subsequent history of the universe being at all times better than it would be at the corresponding times following action B. (Times measured from the agent’s reference frame.) In that case, a consequentialist worthy of the name would conclude that action A was to be preferred to B. For that matter, a non-consequentialist who considered consequences one of several morally important dimensions along which to assess actions, could say that A was better than B in that dimension.
Nice lists.
Neither. It is possible that action A results in the subsequent history of the universe being at all times better than it would be at the corresponding times following action B. (Times measured from the agent’s reference frame.) In that case, a consequentialist worthy of the name would conclude that action A was to be preferred to B. For that matter, a non-consequentialist who considered consequences one of several morally important dimensions along which to assess actions, could say that A was better than B in that dimension.