Assume your optimal dread—there is no moral reason not to kill others, with or without an advantage to yourself. There remain legal reasons not to kill others. Prison is living a long time repeating each day largely like the last, which you have identified as undesirable. It is practical and efficient not to kill others, and that is sufficient reason not to do so.
Everything is connected to everything else, but not equally connected. Butterflies flitting about in Kansas do influence ice patterns on Mars, but not as much (by far) as local conditions on Mars. Your local moral conditions matter more than across all time and space. You can act accordingly.
“I cannot know X as a fact” does not lead to “and therefore I must anti-X.”
Assume your optimal dread—there is no moral reason not to kill others, with or without an advantage to yourself. There remain legal reasons not to kill others. Prison is living a long time repeating each day largely like the last, which you have identified as undesirable. It is practical and efficient not to kill others, and that is sufficient reason not to do so.
So you would kill people if you were sure you wouldn’t get caught?
Assume your optimal dread—there is no moral reason not to kill others, with or without an advantage to yourself. There remain legal reasons not to kill others. Prison is living a long time repeating each day largely like the last, which you have identified as undesirable. It is practical and efficient not to kill others, and that is sufficient reason not to do so.
Everything is connected to everything else, but not equally connected. Butterflies flitting about in Kansas do influence ice patterns on Mars, but not as much (by far) as local conditions on Mars. Your local moral conditions matter more than across all time and space. You can act accordingly.
“I cannot know X as a fact” does not lead to “and therefore I must anti-X.”
So you would kill people if you were sure you wouldn’t get caught?