By systematically applying the rules about what counts as hearsay, judges consciously or unconsciously wind up admitting only evidence that the system views as reliable.
More accurate would be to say that they wind up excluding only evidence that the system views as unreliable. Whether the evidence is reliable is always the jury’s call—a point I don’t think a quibble because hearsay rules are designed to exclude certain unreliable evidence: that which has particular potential to confuse the jury.
From a rationalist perspective, then, you need to consider not only whether multiple levels of hearsay, admissible at each step, tend to confuse the jury or whether, on the other hand, the jury can competently evaluate the noisiness of the evidence’s transmission. I don’t think multiple levels of admissible hearsay have much credibility with jurors; I think the transmission chain is readily subject to effective attack by the defense. (Every child has played the telephone game.) But here is where considering biases would have been fruitful (and necessary to your thesis).
It isn’t enough to prove chains of hearsay are unreliable. Many kinds of evidence are admitted despite their unreliability: say, the testimony of a witness who’s a known habitual liar. The problem for any rule of admissibility is to weigh the risk of the jury being mislead. Unless you can show the jury is unfit to discount multiple levels of hearsay—with the help of a competent adversary—the proposal is tantamount to having juries base their conclusions on less information than they would otherwise use. Since both parties are subject to the same hearsay rules, it could mean being unable to exonerate a defendant with sound evidence based on multiple levels of hearsay, merely because in general multiple levels of hearsay tend to suffer reduced reliability.
More accurate would be to say that they wind up excluding only evidence that the system views as unreliable. Whether the evidence is reliable is always the jury’s call—a point I don’t think a quibble because hearsay rules are designed to exclude certain unreliable evidence: that which has particular potential to confuse the jury.
From a rationalist perspective, then, you need to consider not only whether multiple levels of hearsay, admissible at each step, tend to confuse the jury or whether, on the other hand, the jury can competently evaluate the noisiness of the evidence’s transmission. I don’t think multiple levels of admissible hearsay have much credibility with jurors; I think the transmission chain is readily subject to effective attack by the defense. (Every child has played the telephone game.) But here is where considering biases would have been fruitful (and necessary to your thesis).
It isn’t enough to prove chains of hearsay are unreliable. Many kinds of evidence are admitted despite their unreliability: say, the testimony of a witness who’s a known habitual liar. The problem for any rule of admissibility is to weigh the risk of the jury being mislead. Unless you can show the jury is unfit to discount multiple levels of hearsay—with the help of a competent adversary—the proposal is tantamount to having juries base their conclusions on less information than they would otherwise use. Since both parties are subject to the same hearsay rules, it could mean being unable to exonerate a defendant with sound evidence based on multiple levels of hearsay, merely because in general multiple levels of hearsay tend to suffer reduced reliability.