Some last minute emphasis:
We kind of open with how agents have to grow and learn and be stable, but talk most of the time about this two agent problem, where there is an initial agent and a successor agent. When thinking about it as the succession problem, it seems like a bit of a stretch as a fundamental part of agency. The first two sections were about how agents have to make decisions and have models, and choosing a successor does not seem like as much of a fundamental part of agency. However, when you think it as an agent has to stably continue to optimize over time, it seems a lot more fundamental.
So, I want to emphasize that when we say there are multiple forms of the problem, like choosing successors or learning/growing over time, the view in which these are different at all is a dualistic view. To an embedded agent, the future self is not privileged, it is just another part of the environment, so there is no difference between making a successor and preserving your own goals.
It feels very different to humans. This is because it is much easier for us to change ourselves over time that it is to make a clone of ourselves and change the clone, but that difference is not fundamental.
(Abram has added a note to this effect in the post above, and in the text version.)