Proposal 1 runs into the problem that it does not cooperate with itself if the two copies have slightly different bounds on proof lengths. Since if A cooperates, you can (with a not too long proof) show that B did not find a contradiction. But this contradicts the bounded version of the incompleteness theorem.
You can search for reasons to cooperate in a much stronger formal system than you search for reasons to defect in. Is there any decision-theoretic justification for this?
Proposal 1 runs into the problem that it does not cooperate with itself if the two copies have slightly different bounds on proof lengths. Since if A cooperates, you can (with a not too long proof) show that B did not find a contradiction. But this contradicts the bounded version of the incompleteness theorem.
A similar problem holds for Proposal 2.
You can search for reasons to cooperate in a much stronger formal system than you search for reasons to defect in. Is there any decision-theoretic justification for this?
If you do that, you’re back in the same situation that you started with and are cooperating with CooperateBot again.
This is clearly not true for proposal 2. No matter the formal system, you will find a proof (YouDefect ⇒ OpponentCooperate), and therefore defect.