The question of whether there are any moral givens or not is analagous to the question of whether there are any mathematical givens (which was covered by E.Yudkowsky in an earlier series). Unfortunately, he doesn’t seem to have learned the lesson.
Firstly, in the series on mathematics it was (correctly I think) put forward that even mathematics is not in fact, a priori or axiomatic. 2+2=4 for instance, can be empirically based on the observation that when you have two apples, and you add another two apples, you end up with a total of four apples. So this empirical fact can be taken as empirical evidence that 2+2=4. We don’t directly perceieve the fact that 2+2=4, this mathematical fact is indirectly inferred from the empirical evidence.
Similarly, if there are any moral givens, I would agree that they have to result in real empirical differences. Again, we could never percieve moral givens directly (since they are abstract) - they would have to be indirectly inferred from empricial data.
The question is: what empirical differences would enable us to infer the moral givens? Ah, now that would be giving the game away wouldn’t it? ;)
But again, clues can be obtained by looking at the arguments over whether math is objective or not, and reasoning by analogy for morality.
pure math is concerned with the objective logical properties of physical systems. These properties do exist… as demonstrated by the example of taking 2 apples, adding another 2 and always getting a total of 4. This is the empirical evidence for the postulated objective logical/mathematics properties.
But… applied math (for example probability theory) is not about objective logical properties, instead, it is about cognitive systems, or the process of making inferences about the objective logical/mathematical properties. The key point to note here, is that probablity theory only works because there do exist objective logical/mathematical properties of systems independently of observers. So the existence of these logical/mathematical properties is what ensures the coherence of probability theory. If there were no objective logical/mathematical properties independent of observers (ie for example adding 2 apples to another 2 apples did not always result in 4 apples in a consistent way) then probability theory would not work.
Just as math was concerned with logical properties of physical systems, so, if moral givens exist, they would be concerned with teleological properties of physical systems. And what science deal with this? Decision theory of course. It is the moral givens that provide the explanatory justification for decision theory.
Just as postulating real mathematical entities provided the explanatory justification for probablity theory, so too, does postulating the existence of real moral givens provide the explanatory justification for decision theory.
Why does decision theory work? What are these mysterious ‘utilities’ that keep being referred to? Are they preferences? No (in some cases at least), they’re moral givens ;)
sigh
Not even close, any of you ;)
The question of whether there are any moral givens or not is analagous to the question of whether there are any mathematical givens (which was covered by E.Yudkowsky in an earlier series). Unfortunately, he doesn’t seem to have learned the lesson.
Firstly, in the series on mathematics it was (correctly I think) put forward that even mathematics is not in fact, a priori or axiomatic. 2+2=4 for instance, can be empirically based on the observation that when you have two apples, and you add another two apples, you end up with a total of four apples. So this empirical fact can be taken as empirical evidence that 2+2=4. We don’t directly perceieve the fact that 2+2=4, this mathematical fact is indirectly inferred from the empirical evidence.
Similarly, if there are any moral givens, I would agree that they have to result in real empirical differences. Again, we could never percieve moral givens directly (since they are abstract) - they would have to be indirectly inferred from empricial data.
The question is: what empirical differences would enable us to infer the moral givens? Ah, now that would be giving the game away wouldn’t it? ;)
But again, clues can be obtained by looking at the arguments over whether math is objective or not, and reasoning by analogy for morality.
pure math is concerned with the objective logical properties of physical systems. These properties do exist… as demonstrated by the example of taking 2 apples, adding another 2 and always getting a total of 4. This is the empirical evidence for the postulated objective logical/mathematics properties.
But… applied math (for example probability theory) is not about objective logical properties, instead, it is about cognitive systems, or the process of making inferences about the objective logical/mathematical properties. The key point to note here, is that probablity theory only works because there do exist objective logical/mathematical properties of systems independently of observers. So the existence of these logical/mathematical properties is what ensures the coherence of probability theory. If there were no objective logical/mathematical properties independent of observers (ie for example adding 2 apples to another 2 apples did not always result in 4 apples in a consistent way) then probability theory would not work.
Just as math was concerned with logical properties of physical systems, so, if moral givens exist, they would be concerned with teleological properties of physical systems. And what science deal with this? Decision theory of course. It is the moral givens that provide the explanatory justification for decision theory.
Just as postulating real mathematical entities provided the explanatory justification for probablity theory, so too, does postulating the existence of real moral givens provide the explanatory justification for decision theory.
Why does decision theory work? What are these mysterious ‘utilities’ that keep being referred to? Are they preferences? No (in some cases at least), they’re moral givens ;)