This is perhaps an example of when understanding a formal cause, in this case logical truths about certain machine learning architectures, is more enlightening than understanding an efficient cause, in this case contingent facts about evolutionary dynamics. It is generally the case that formal-causal explanations are more enlightening than efficient-causal explanations, but efficient-causal explanations are generally easier to discover, which is why the sciences are so specialized for understanding efficient causes. There are sometimes trends towards a more form-oriented approach, e.g. cybernetics, complexity sciences, aspects of evo-devo, and so on, but they’re always on the edge of what is possible with traditional scientific methods and thus their particular findings are unfortunately often afflicted with an aura of unrigor.
Of note is that the only difference between “causal” decision theory and “timeless” decision theory is that the latter’s description emphasizes the taking-into-account of formal causes, which is only implicit in any technically-well-founded causal decision theory and is for some unfathomable reason completely ignored by academic decision theorists. (If you get down to the level of an actually formalized decision theory then you’re working with Markovian causality, where as far as I can discern CDT and TDT are no different.)
I am still reading through the older posts on LW and haven’t seen CDT ot TDT yet (or haven’t recognized it), but when I do, I will reread your comment and will hopefully understand how the second part of the comment is connected to the first...
This is the LW decision theory portal. If you’re reading through Eliezer’s sequences I don’t think there’s much discussion about the foundations of decision theory there.
This is perhaps an example of when understanding a formal cause, in this case logical truths about certain machine learning architectures, is more enlightening than understanding an efficient cause, in this case contingent facts about evolutionary dynamics. It is generally the case that formal-causal explanations are more enlightening than efficient-causal explanations, but efficient-causal explanations are generally easier to discover, which is why the sciences are so specialized for understanding efficient causes. There are sometimes trends towards a more form-oriented approach, e.g. cybernetics, complexity sciences, aspects of evo-devo, and so on, but they’re always on the edge of what is possible with traditional scientific methods and thus their particular findings are unfortunately often afflicted with an aura of unrigor.
Of note is that the only difference between “causal” decision theory and “timeless” decision theory is that the latter’s description emphasizes the taking-into-account of formal causes, which is only implicit in any technically-well-founded causal decision theory and is for some unfathomable reason completely ignored by academic decision theorists. (If you get down to the level of an actually formalized decision theory then you’re working with Markovian causality, where as far as I can discern CDT and TDT are no different.)
I am still reading through the older posts on LW and haven’t seen CDT ot TDT yet (or haven’t recognized it), but when I do, I will reread your comment and will hopefully understand how the second part of the comment is connected to the first...
This is the LW decision theory portal. If you’re reading through Eliezer’s sequences I don’t think there’s much discussion about the foundations of decision theory there.