I am guessing the French guy you are thinking of is François Kammerer. To my knowledge, he is the only illusionist advancing that line right now, and Frankish is directly replying to him. Now, part of the project does need to involve what it is about experiences which grounds their normative value. But that’s exactly what I mean to address here:
> Instead, illusionists have to work out what features about pleasure & pain that is responsible for our evaluative stance towards them: what is it about pleasure, in purely material terms, which causes us to judge that it is good? What is a ‘judgment’ here, and what does it require? How do these judgments give us reason to act? This will require a careful act of integrating empirical facts into a system of normative value. I have expressed some doubts about whether this is possible, but it seems that outside of a few papers by François Kammerer, it has not been given a serious try.
Thanks for the education, I’ve read quite some Frankish et al. but somehow I had missed that part. Yes, Kammerer interviews it was! Looking fwd to reading your two posts! Background: I always found Illusionists, but if you thus want Kammerer, ‘stupid’ in claiming, say, ‘actual reason to genuinely care’ may not fall apart if (thus, say, Kammerer’s strong) illusionism held, and Kammerer’s talk about the reasons I found really low-grade philo confabulation. Since a few years I, let’s say ‘intellectually’, put quite some credence to that type of illusionism, in a way (emotionally rather not at all so far), and find it super dangeorous. (fwiw I actually think rather than ‘machine is conscious’, the AI development may in my expectation also nudge, say, careful enquirers more towards such strong illusionism and it may be terrible—and be terrible even if potentially true, to the degree that ‘terrible’ then still deserves a place in language). May my other comment be downvoted appropriately :)
I am guessing the French guy you are thinking of is François Kammerer. To my knowledge, he is the only illusionist advancing that line right now, and Frankish is directly replying to him. Now, part of the project does need to involve what it is about experiences which grounds their normative value. But that’s exactly what I mean to address here:
> Instead, illusionists have to work out what features about pleasure & pain that is responsible for our evaluative stance towards them: what is it about pleasure, in purely material terms, which causes us to judge that it is good? What is a ‘judgment’ here, and what does it require? How do these judgments give us reason to act? This will require a careful act of integrating empirical facts into a system of normative value. I have expressed some doubts about whether this is possible, but it seems that outside of a few papers by François Kammerer, it has not been given a serious try.
Thanks for the education, I’ve read quite some Frankish et al. but somehow I had missed that part. Yes, Kammerer interviews it was! Looking fwd to reading your two posts! Background: I always found Illusionists, but if you thus want Kammerer, ‘stupid’ in claiming, say, ‘actual reason to genuinely care’ may not fall apart if (thus, say, Kammerer’s strong) illusionism held, and Kammerer’s talk about the reasons I found really low-grade philo confabulation. Since a few years I, let’s say ‘intellectually’, put quite some credence to that type of illusionism, in a way (emotionally rather not at all so far), and find it super dangeorous. (fwiw I actually think rather than ‘machine is conscious’, the AI development may in my expectation also nudge, say, careful enquirers more towards such strong illusionism and it may be terrible—and be terrible even if potentially true, to the degree that ‘terrible’ then still deserves a place in language). May my other comment be downvoted appropriately :)