Sadly, I am still the only entity who is publicly talking about how BSL-4 labs need to post cryptographic timestamps of all of their records (I searched the internet for posts about this issue made by others, but I was only able to find my own posts), and the only way I see this really changing is if the next pandemic possibly comes from a lab causes a few people to wake up and realize that BSL-4 labs currently have insufficient security standards. Since I do not expect for BSL-4 labs to post cryptographic timestamps of all their records on blockchains nor do I make anyone except for myself to make a significant effort in making sure that BSL-4 labs post these cryptographic timestamps, I have adapted my views about the security of BSL-4 labs.
I am now only asking for BSL-4 labs to publicly post cryptographic timestamps of all their records instead of worrying about making sure that these cryptographic timestamps make their way to public blockchains. For example, if a BSL-4 labs publicly posts a cryptographic hash or a Merkle root of all its new data every 10 minutes (on a website) without paying the transaction fee to put this cryptographic hash or Merkle root on a public blockchain, then that would be fine with me. In this case, BSL-4 labs do not need to pay cryptocurrency transaction fees, and people at BSL-4 labs can be completely oblivious to the usefulness of cryptocurrency technologies for bio-safety and that would be fine with me. But in this case, someone else needs to periodically take the cryptographic timestamps from the BSL-4 labs and post these on public blockchains. Perhaps a web spider can go on the websites for the BSL-4 labs and gather their cryptographic hashes to make sure that they end up on blockchains. Of course, in this case, for security, there should probably be multiple organizations that make sure that the cryptographic timestamps make their way to blockchains, but at least this will make it a little easier for BSL-4 labs to do what they need to do.
Someone on this site referred me to a paper with a similar proposal by those with medical and biological knowledge Aleksandr V. Kudriavtsev, Anna Vakhrusheva, and Alexander Shneider (but who have less expertise in information security and cryptography) which proposes using private blockchains (it looks like this is just a shared database where deleting information is not allowed) to track the origin and dissemination of scientific data. Their idea may have some merit (though such an idea would require more data to be shared between more people, and this could be a security hazard, so maybe it is best if just the timestamps are made public), but at this point, we need to implement the simplest and most inexpensive solution which is for the BSL-4 labs to post those cryptographic timestamps publicly.
Sadly, I am still the only entity who is publicly talking about how BSL-4 labs need to post cryptographic timestamps of all of their records (I searched the internet for posts about this issue made by others, but I was only able to find my own posts), and the only way I see this really changing is if the next pandemic possibly comes from a lab causes a few people to wake up and realize that BSL-4 labs currently have insufficient security standards. Since I do not expect for BSL-4 labs to post cryptographic timestamps of all their records on blockchains nor do I make anyone except for myself to make a significant effort in making sure that BSL-4 labs post these cryptographic timestamps, I have adapted my views about the security of BSL-4 labs.
I am now only asking for BSL-4 labs to publicly post cryptographic timestamps of all their records instead of worrying about making sure that these cryptographic timestamps make their way to public blockchains. For example, if a BSL-4 labs publicly posts a cryptographic hash or a Merkle root of all its new data every 10 minutes (on a website) without paying the transaction fee to put this cryptographic hash or Merkle root on a public blockchain, then that would be fine with me. In this case, BSL-4 labs do not need to pay cryptocurrency transaction fees, and people at BSL-4 labs can be completely oblivious to the usefulness of cryptocurrency technologies for bio-safety and that would be fine with me. But in this case, someone else needs to periodically take the cryptographic timestamps from the BSL-4 labs and post these on public blockchains. Perhaps a web spider can go on the websites for the BSL-4 labs and gather their cryptographic hashes to make sure that they end up on blockchains. Of course, in this case, for security, there should probably be multiple organizations that make sure that the cryptographic timestamps make their way to blockchains, but at least this will make it a little easier for BSL-4 labs to do what they need to do.
Someone on this site referred me to a paper with a similar proposal by those with medical and biological knowledge Aleksandr V. Kudriavtsev, Anna Vakhrusheva, and Alexander Shneider (but who have less expertise in information security and cryptography) which proposes using private blockchains (it looks like this is just a shared database where deleting information is not allowed) to track the origin and dissemination of scientific data. Their idea may have some merit (though such an idea would require more data to be shared between more people, and this could be a security hazard, so maybe it is best if just the timestamps are made public), but at this point, we need to implement the simplest and most inexpensive solution which is for the BSL-4 labs to post those cryptographic timestamps publicly.