For how long can we go insisting that “but these are just functional self-reports” before the functionality starts becoming so sophisticated that we have to seriously suspect there is some phenomenal consciousness going on, too?
I think you have to examine it by case. Either consciousness is functional (Subjective consciousness impacts human behavior; ‘free will’ exists) or it is not (Subjective consciousness has no influence on human behavior; ‘free will’ does not exist).
If consciousness has a determinative effect on behavior—your consciousness decides to do something and this causes you to do it—then it can be modeled as a black box within your brain’s information processing pipeline such that your actions cannot be accurately modeled without accounting for it. It would not be possible to precisely predict what you will say or do by simply multiplying out neuron activations on a sheet of paper, because the sheet of paper certainly isn’t conscious, nor is your pencil. The innate mathematical correctness of whatever the correct answer is not brought about or altered by your having written it down, so you cannot hide the consciousness away in math itself, unless you assert that all possible mental states are always simultaneously being felt.
If consciousness does not have a determinative effect on behavior, then it is impossible to meaningfully guess at what is or isn’t conscious, because it has no measurable effect on the observable world. A rock could be conscious, or not. There is some arbitrary algorithm that assigns consciousness to objects, and the only datapoint in your possession is yourself. “It’s conscious if it talks like a human” isn’t any more likely to be correct than “every subset of the atoms in the universe is conscious”.
In the first case, we know the exact parameters of all LLMs, and we know the algorithm that can be applied to convert inputs into outputs, so we can assert definitively that they are not conscious. In the second case, consciousness is an unambiguously religious question, as it cannot be empirically proven, nor disproven, nor even shown to be more or less likely between any pair of objects.
this seems to assume that consciousness is epiphenomenal.
To my understanding, epiphenomenalism is the belief that subjective consciousness is dependent on the state of the physical world, but not the other way around. I absolutely do not think I assumed this—I stated that it is either true (“If consciousness does not have a determinative effect on behavior,”) or it is not (“If consciousness has a determinative effect on behavior,”). The basis of my claim is a proof by case which aims to address both possibilities.
“If consciousness has a determinative effect on behavior—your consciousness decides to do something and this causes you to do it—then it can be modeled as a black box within your brain’s information processing pipeline such that your actions cannot be accurately modeled without accounting for it. It would not be possible to precisely predict what you will say or do by simply multiplying out neuron activations on a sheet of paper, because the sheet of paper certainly isn’t conscious, nor is your pencil. The innate mathematical correctness of whatever the correct answer is not brought about or altered by your having written it down, so you cannot hide the consciousness away in math itself, unless you assert that all possible mental states are always simultaneously being felt.”
The alternative is that consciousness has a determinative effect on behavior, and yet it is indeed possible to precisely predict what you will say or do by simply multiplying out neuron activations on a sheet of paper, because the neuron activations are what creates the function of consciousness.
this is what it means, in my eyes, to believe that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon. it is part of observable reality, it is part of what is calculated by the neurons.
I think I can cite the entire p zombie sequence here? if you believe that it is possible to learn everything there is to know about the physical human brain, and yet have consciousness still be unexplained, then consciousness must not be part of the physical human brain. at that point, it’s either an epiphenomenon, or it’s a non-physical phenomenon.
I think you have to examine it by case. Either consciousness is functional (Subjective consciousness impacts human behavior; ‘free will’ exists) or it is not (Subjective consciousness has no influence on human behavior; ‘free will’ does not exist).
If consciousness has a determinative effect on behavior—your consciousness decides to do something and this causes you to do it—then it can be modeled as a black box within your brain’s information processing pipeline such that your actions cannot be accurately modeled without accounting for it. It would not be possible to precisely predict what you will say or do by simply multiplying out neuron activations on a sheet of paper, because the sheet of paper certainly isn’t conscious, nor is your pencil. The innate mathematical correctness of whatever the correct answer is not brought about or altered by your having written it down, so you cannot hide the consciousness away in math itself, unless you assert that all possible mental states are always simultaneously being felt.
If consciousness does not have a determinative effect on behavior, then it is impossible to meaningfully guess at what is or isn’t conscious, because it has no measurable effect on the observable world. A rock could be conscious, or not. There is some arbitrary algorithm that assigns consciousness to objects, and the only datapoint in your possession is yourself. “It’s conscious if it talks like a human” isn’t any more likely to be correct than “every subset of the atoms in the universe is conscious”.
In the first case, we know the exact parameters of all LLMs, and we know the algorithm that can be applied to convert inputs into outputs, so we can assert definitively that they are not conscious. In the second case, consciousness is an unambiguously religious question, as it cannot be empirically proven, nor disproven, nor even shown to be more or less likely between any pair of objects.
this seems to assume that consciousness is epiphenomenal. you are positing the coherency of p zombies. this is very much a controversial claim.
To my understanding, epiphenomenalism is the belief that subjective consciousness is dependent on the state of the physical world, but not the other way around. I absolutely do not think I assumed this—I stated that it is either true (“If consciousness does not have a determinative effect on behavior,”) or it is not (“If consciousness has a determinative effect on behavior,”). The basis of my claim is a proof by case which aims to address both possibilities.
“If consciousness has a determinative effect on behavior—your consciousness decides to do something and this causes you to do it—then it can be modeled as a black box within your brain’s information processing pipeline such that your actions cannot be accurately modeled without accounting for it. It would not be possible to precisely predict what you will say or do by simply multiplying out neuron activations on a sheet of paper, because the sheet of paper certainly isn’t conscious, nor is your pencil. The innate mathematical correctness of whatever the correct answer is not brought about or altered by your having written it down, so you cannot hide the consciousness away in math itself, unless you assert that all possible mental states are always simultaneously being felt.”
The alternative is that consciousness has a determinative effect on behavior, and yet it is indeed possible to precisely predict what you will say or do by simply multiplying out neuron activations on a sheet of paper, because the neuron activations are what creates the function of consciousness.
this is what it means, in my eyes, to believe that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon. it is part of observable reality, it is part of what is calculated by the neurons.
I think I can cite the entire p zombie sequence here? if you believe that it is possible to learn everything there is to know about the physical human brain, and yet have consciousness still be unexplained, then consciousness must not be part of the physical human brain. at that point, it’s either an epiphenomenon, or it’s a non-physical phenomenon.