I don’t think the Church-Turing Thesis is quite equivalent, because someone might think (even if they don’t have good reasons for thinking it) that some human behavior (say, “having mathematical insights”) is not algorithmicly computable.
As I understand Searle, his views aren’t relevant here, because even if we got to the point where AIs can replace all human workers, Searle would still insist they aren’t really thinking.
Dreyfus sounds interesting, though, will have to look into it.
I don’t think the Church-Turing Thesis is quite equivalent, because someone might think (even if they don’t have good reasons for thinking it) that some human behavior (say, “having mathematical insights”) is not algorithmicly computable.
As I understand Searle, his views aren’t relevant here, because even if we got to the point where AIs can replace all human workers, Searle would still insist they aren’t really thinking.
Dreyfus sounds interesting, though, will have to look into it.