I have one question about a passage earlier on, which points out a flaw in FP:
Finally, consider the problem of habit. I sit at my computer and want to type my name, ‘Luke.’ However, I hve just used a special program to switch the function of the keys labeled L and P so that they will input the other character instead (so that I can play a prank on my friend, who will be using my computer shortly). I believe that typing the key labeled L will input P instead, but nevertheless when I type my name my fingers fall into their familiar habit and I end up typing my name as ‘Puke.’ My act of typing was intentional, and yet I didn’t do what I believed would fulfill my desire to type my name.
I don’t follow how this is an argument against FP. If the results of the action were different than intended, that doesn’t seem to contradict FP’s model, which merely requires that the person thought of the intended result first, and specifically performed the action with an expectation of that result coming to pass.
Excellent article! I really like this style.
I have one question about a passage earlier on, which points out a flaw in FP:
I don’t follow how this is an argument against FP. If the results of the action were different than intended, that doesn’t seem to contradict FP’s model, which merely requires that the person thought of the intended result first, and specifically performed the action with an expectation of that result coming to pass.