1) I will do all things such that they maximize expected paperclip content of the universe, trading off smaller paperclip quantities for larger ones. I can’t express a more specific algorithm than that without knowing the particulars of the situation.
2) I will do much better than humans at finding the ultimate morality* of the universe because I can spend all my resources to make perfect copies of myself that share my values and update knowledge and reflective value equilibria among each other, rather than having to pursue other values like “signaling” (except when I post here, of course).
* Note I said ultimate morality, not ultimate paperclippiness. There’s a strange tendency here to equate everything I like with “paperclippiness”, and everything humans like with “morality” or “friendliness”. Wrong: we all want morality (humans and clippys), we just disagree about what counts as moral. To use the alternate naming scheme of calling my values “paperclippy” and human values “morality” is to assume away the problem. (Certainly, I sometimes fall into the trap of calling good things, either for humans or clippys, “paperclippy”—see here—but this is just when I’m being imprecise with my phrasings.)
Thanks for answering my questions. I think I have a better understanding of your values now.
My empathy circuits are lighting up, telling me I should buy a box of paperclips and keep them safe for you. And that I should put them on display as a warning to myself.
1) I will do all things such that they maximize expected paperclip content of the universe, trading off smaller paperclip quantities for larger ones. I can’t express a more specific algorithm than that without knowing the particulars of the situation.
2) I will do much better than humans at finding the ultimate morality* of the universe because I can spend all my resources to make perfect copies of myself that share my values and update knowledge and reflective value equilibria among each other, rather than having to pursue other values like “signaling” (except when I post here, of course).
* Note I said ultimate morality, not ultimate paperclippiness. There’s a strange tendency here to equate everything I like with “paperclippiness”, and everything humans like with “morality” or “friendliness”. Wrong: we all want morality (humans and clippys), we just disagree about what counts as moral. To use the alternate naming scheme of calling my values “paperclippy” and human values “morality” is to assume away the problem. (Certainly, I sometimes fall into the trap of calling good things, either for humans or clippys, “paperclippy”—see here—but this is just when I’m being imprecise with my phrasings.)
Thanks for answering my questions. I think I have a better understanding of your values now.
My empathy circuits are lighting up, telling me I should buy a box of paperclips and keep them safe for you. And that I should put them on display as a warning to myself.
A warning of what???
How morality can go awry.
I already have a framed print of Hug Bot on my wall.