Thanks. Then, if faster than light travel was possible, I wouldn’t be opposed to believing in things outside the Cosmological Horizon. Since that speed is impossible, I’m opposed to believing in things that leave here to go outside, or in things that were outside the entire time.
There is no way of knowing what things are like outside because we can never go outside and we have never been outside to observe, and we have no reason to believe that our current observations apply to the outside because there’s as much justification for the assumption that the outside is the same as the inside as there is for the assumption that the outside is fundamentally different.
(...) and we have no reason to believe that our current observations apply to the outside.
Not quite true.
Occam’s Razor says things are probably the same everywhere, whether inside or outside, which points towards our observations applying to the outside.
Since our observations apply to pretty much all of the inside, we should infer that they are also more likely to apply to pretty much any part of the outside because inference usually works with large samples (and the entire observable universe is something I’d consider a fairly large sample, if nothing within the observable universe goes against our current observations).
So we have two principles we could use to believe that our current observations apply to the outside. This requires that our priors for inference and Occam’s Razor working be set pretty high, obviously.
Thanks. Then, if faster than light travel was possible, I wouldn’t be opposed to believing in things outside the Cosmological Horizon. Since that speed is impossible, I’m opposed to believing in things that leave here to go outside, or in things that were outside the entire time.
There is no way of knowing what things are like outside because we can never go outside and we have never been outside to observe, and we have no reason to believe that our current observations apply to the outside because there’s as much justification for the assumption that the outside is the same as the inside as there is for the assumption that the outside is fundamentally different.
Not quite true.
Occam’s Razor says things are probably the same everywhere, whether inside or outside, which points towards our observations applying to the outside.
Since our observations apply to pretty much all of the inside, we should infer that they are also more likely to apply to pretty much any part of the outside because inference usually works with large samples (and the entire observable universe is something I’d consider a fairly large sample, if nothing within the observable universe goes against our current observations).
So we have two principles we could use to believe that our current observations apply to the outside. This requires that our priors for inference and Occam’s Razor working be set pretty high, obviously.