And then you have people like H0, who notices H2 is crazy, decides that that means that they shouldn’t even try to be altruistic, and accuses H1 of hypocrisy because she’s not like H2. (Exhibit A)
That is my expectation also. However, persuading H2 of that (“but dead babies!”) is likely to be a work of counselling or spiritual guidance rather than reason.
Well… so, if we both expect H1 to do more good than H2, it seems that if we were to look at them through the eyes of utilitarianism, we would endorse being H1 over being H2. But you seem to be saying that H2, looking through the eyes of utilitarianism, endorses being H2 over being H1. I am therefore deeply confused by your model of what’s going on here.
Oh yes, H1 is more effective, heathier, saner, more rational, etc. than H2. H2 is experiencing existential panic and cannot relinquish his death-grip on the idea.
Do you think being a utilitarian makes someone less effective, healthy, sane, rational etc.? Or do you think H2 has these various traits independent of them being a utilitarian?
WARNING: More discussion of a basilisk, with a link to a real-world example.
It’s a possible failure mode of utilitarianism. Some people succumb to it (see George Price for an actual example of a similar failure) and some don’t.
I don’t understand your confusion and this pair of questions just seems misconceived.
(shrug) OK. I certainly agree with you that some utilitarians suffer from the existential panic and inability to relinquish their death-grips on unhealthy ideas, while others don’t. I’m tapping out here.
One could reason that one is better placed to do good effectively when focussing on oneself, ones family, one’s community, etc, simply because one understands them better.
Consider two humans, H1 and H2, both utilitarians.
H1 looks at the world the way you describe Peter Singer here.
H2 looks at the world “through the eyes of utilitarianism” as you describe it here.
My expectation is that H1 will do more good in their lifetime than H2.
What’s your expectation?
And then you have people like H0, who notices H2 is crazy, decides that that means that they shouldn’t even try to be altruistic, and accuses H1 of hypocrisy because she’s not like H2. (Exhibit A)
That is my expectation also. However, persuading H2 of that (“but dead babies!”) is likely to be a work of counselling or spiritual guidance rather than reason.
Well… so, if we both expect H1 to do more good than H2, it seems that if we were to look at them through the eyes of utilitarianism, we would endorse being H1 over being H2.
But you seem to be saying that H2, looking through the eyes of utilitarianism, endorses being H2 over being H1.
I am therefore deeply confused by your model of what’s going on here.
Oh yes, H1 is more effective, heathier, saner, more rational, etc. than H2. H2 is experiencing existential panic and cannot relinquish his death-grip on the idea.
You confuse me further with every post.
Do you think being a utilitarian makes someone less effective, healthy, sane, rational etc.?
Or do you think H2 has these various traits independent of them being a utilitarian?
There’s a lot of different kinds of utilitarian.
WARNING: More discussion of a basilisk, with a link to a real-world example.
It’s a possible failure mode of utilitarianism. Some people succumb to it (see George Price for an actual example of a similar failure) and some don’t.
I don’t understand your confusion and this pair of questions just seems misconceived.
(shrug) OK.
I certainly agree with you that some utilitarians suffer from the existential panic and inability to relinquish their death-grips on unhealthy ideas, while others don’t.
I’m tapping out here.
One could reason that one is better placed to do good effectively when focussing on oneself, ones family, one’s community, etc, simply because one understands them better.