I think you misunderstood my comment, and in any case, that’s a non sequitur, because the problem is not only with the complexity, but also the artificiality of the situation. I’ll try to state my position more clearly.
Let’s divide moral problems into three categories, based on: (a) how plausible the situation is in reality, and (b) whether the problem is unrealistically oversimplified in terms of knowledge, predictability, and inter-personal utility comparisons:
Plausible scenario, realistically complex.
Implausible scenario, realistically complex.
Implausible scenario, oversimplified.
(The fourth logical possibility is not realistic, since any plausible scenario will feature realistic complications.) For example, trolley problems are in category (3), while problems that appear in reality are always in categories (1) and (2), and overwhelmingly in (1).
My claim is that utilitarianism provides an exact methodology for working with type 3 problems, but it completely fails for types 1 and 2, practically without exception. On the other hand, virtue ethics turns out to be more fuzzy and subjective when compared with utilitarianism in type 3 problems (though it still handles them tolerably well), but unlike utilitarianism, it is also capable of handling types 1 and 2, and it usually handles the first (and most important) type extremely well. Therefore, it is fallacious to make general conclusions about the merits of these approaches from thought experiments with type 3 problems.
Virtue ethics handles scenarios of type 1 (plausible scenarios that are realistically complex) extremely well.
I agree with this similar statement: communities of people committed to being virtuous have good outcomes (as evaluated by Sewing-Machine). I do not agree with this similar statement: communities of people committed to being virtuous are less confused about morality than I am.
I think you misunderstood my comment, and in any case, that’s a non sequitur, because the problem is not only with the complexity, but also the artificiality of the situation. I’ll try to state my position more clearly.
Let’s divide moral problems into three categories, based on: (a) how plausible the situation is in reality, and (b) whether the problem is unrealistically oversimplified in terms of knowledge, predictability, and inter-personal utility comparisons:
Plausible scenario, realistically complex.
Implausible scenario, realistically complex.
Implausible scenario, oversimplified.
(The fourth logical possibility is not realistic, since any plausible scenario will feature realistic complications.) For example, trolley problems are in category (3), while problems that appear in reality are always in categories (1) and (2), and overwhelmingly in (1).
My claim is that utilitarianism provides an exact methodology for working with type 3 problems, but it completely fails for types 1 and 2, practically without exception. On the other hand, virtue ethics turns out to be more fuzzy and subjective when compared with utilitarianism in type 3 problems (though it still handles them tolerably well), but unlike utilitarianism, it is also capable of handling types 1 and 2, and it usually handles the first (and most important) type extremely well. Therefore, it is fallacious to make general conclusions about the merits of these approaches from thought experiments with type 3 problems.
I am not a utilitarian.
I agree with this similar statement: communities of people committed to being virtuous have good outcomes (as evaluated by Sewing-Machine). I do not agree with this similar statement: communities of people committed to being virtuous are less confused about morality than I am.