Qualia have the property of ineffability, and no other. They are just cognitive blind spots.
Ineffability can be explained reductionistically.
Therefore, qualia can be explained reductionasitically.
Then the objection would be
Qualia are crucial to morally relevance—it is not OK to torture sims that actually feel pain.
Ineffability, the possession of cognitive blind spots is not morally relevant. (“How dare you torture that sim, don’t you realise it is unable to introspectively access everything in its mind!”)
Therefore, qualia are not defined solely by ineffability/inacessibility.
A shorter way of getting to the same conclusion.
If Orthonormal’s argument summarises to
Qualia have the property of ineffability, and no other. They are just cognitive blind spots.
Ineffability can be explained reductionistically.
Therefore, qualia can be explained reductionasitically.
Then the objection would be
Qualia are crucial to morally relevance—it is not OK to torture sims that actually feel pain.
Ineffability, the possession of cognitive blind spots is not morally relevant. (“How dare you torture that sim, don’t you realise it is unable to introspectively access everything in its mind!”)
Therefore, qualia are not defined solely by ineffability/inacessibility.