Consider the problem in the Least Convenient Possible World. What if the happiness of stupidity really is much better than what smart people have, and there aren’t any significant lows?
This is not a valid application of the LCPW. The LCPW is not one in which the assertion that someone is arguing for is simply supposed to be false. It is one in which all ways of getting undeserved assistance to the desired conclusion are eliminated.
If someone argues that rationality is better than stupidity, the LCPW does not consist of saying “but suppose stupidity was better than rationality?” That is not even an imagined possible world, just a verbally supposed contradiction of the conclusion.
I agree, but look at beriukay’s reply—he/she stated that stupidity would still be undesirable even if there were no lows. This implies that his/her true rejection of self-imposed stupidity was what he/she initially stated in the grandparent comment. Though my application of LCPW wasn’t entirely correct, all I was trying to do was determine if “lows” was really beriukay’s true rejection.
This is not a valid application of the LCPW. The LCPW is not one in which the assertion that someone is arguing for is simply supposed to be false. It is one in which all ways of getting undeserved assistance to the desired conclusion are eliminated.
If someone argues that rationality is better than stupidity, the LCPW does not consist of saying “but suppose stupidity was better than rationality?” That is not even an imagined possible world, just a verbally supposed contradiction of the conclusion.
I agree, but look at beriukay’s reply—he/she stated that stupidity would still be undesirable even if there were no lows. This implies that his/her true rejection of self-imposed stupidity was what he/she initially stated in the grandparent comment. Though my application of LCPW wasn’t entirely correct, all I was trying to do was determine if “lows” was really beriukay’s true rejection.