The person who sincerely, but falsely believes p is not lying when they assert p. Someone who has greater awareness and knows that p is false has one fewer option to chose from morally: he can’t say p, because that would be lying.
True, and true.
This becomes a problem especially when there is a social cost attached to not saying p, in which case the person with greater knowledge is effectively penalized: they have to either do something immoral (lying) or incur the costs of failing to say p (or, God forbid, saying ~p!).
Yes; but why should there be a penalty for not saying p? Surely it is just as likely, on average, that there will be a penalty for not saying the inverse of p (in which case greater self-awareness rewards instead of penalizes).
Yes; but why should there be a penalty for not saying p? Surely it is just as likely, on average, that there will be a penalty for not saying the inverse of p (in which case greater self-awareness rewards instead of penalizes).
In the case that was the starting point of this dicussion, there surely is a penalty for saying ~p, but quite possibly also one for failing to say p: your partner might complain if they never hear nice things about themselves from you (or at least not nice things of the kind they want to hear).
On average, I would expect it to be more likely that there is a social penalty for failing to say something that only a very self-aware person would not believe (i.e. for failing to go along with the “official narrative”) than that there is a social penalty for not saying something that only a very self-aware person would know (thereby forcing non-self-aware people to lie).
In the case that was the starting point of this dicussion, there surely is a penalty for saying ~p, but quite possibly also one for failing to say p: your partner might complain if they never hear nice things about themselves from you (or at least not nice things of the kind they want to hear).
Ah; so you’re not arguing that there’s a moral penalty for self-awareness in all situations, you’re saying that there’s a moral penalty for self-awareness in a specific situation! (Apologies; I was trying to consider the rule as applied in general).
Thank you, that helped to clear things up.
And, just to make sure that there’s no more assumption traps (i.e. where we each assume that something mutually exclusive is obvious) I will describe my understanding of that situation (correct me if I’m wrong):
A person finds a romantic partner to which they are attracted. He (or she) compliments said partner on some aspect which he (or she) finds attractive only due to the halo effect; on the basis of these compliments, both partners enter a long-term romantic relationship. The person later improves their self-awareness, and realises that the earlier compliments were only due to the halo effect; admitting so then carries a social penalty.
In that case, I would agree; however, improved self-knowledge earlier in the process can head off the problem entirely. So it’s not penalizing self-knowledge; it’s rather penalizing the earlier lack of self-knowledge.
Ah; so you’re not arguing that there’s a moral penalty for self-awareness in all situations, you’re saying that there’s a moral penalty for self-awareness in a specific situation!
Yes, exactly. Sorry, I didn’t quite catch that you thought we were talking about a general rule or I would have cleared this up earlier.
In that case, I would agree; however, improved self-knowledge earlier in the process can head off the problem entirely. So it’s not penalizing self-knowledge; it’s rather penalizing the earlier lack of self-knowledge.
I don’t think so. It’s penalizing becoming self-aware. After all, if the person never became self-aware, she would never incur the penalty.
I don’t think so. It’s penalizing becoming self-aware. After all, if the person never became self-aware, she would never incur the penalty.
And, similarly, if a person never hits the ground, he never incurs any injury from falling. If he becomes self-aware quickly enough, then he takes comparatively minor social damage—as a man who falls and quickly hits the ground may only twist an ankle. If he becomes self-aware only after twenty years of marriage, then he potentially takes severe social damage; as a man who falls from a skyscraper, take severe damage when he hits the ground.
So, yes, I can see why you make that statement; it is a reasonable statement, but I think it places the emphasis on the wrong part of the fall.
True, and true.
Yes; but why should there be a penalty for not saying p? Surely it is just as likely, on average, that there will be a penalty for not saying the inverse of p (in which case greater self-awareness rewards instead of penalizes).
In the case that was the starting point of this dicussion, there surely is a penalty for saying ~p, but quite possibly also one for failing to say p: your partner might complain if they never hear nice things about themselves from you (or at least not nice things of the kind they want to hear).
On average, I would expect it to be more likely that there is a social penalty for failing to say something that only a very self-aware person would not believe (i.e. for failing to go along with the “official narrative”) than that there is a social penalty for not saying something that only a very self-aware person would know (thereby forcing non-self-aware people to lie).
Ah; so you’re not arguing that there’s a moral penalty for self-awareness in all situations, you’re saying that there’s a moral penalty for self-awareness in a specific situation! (Apologies; I was trying to consider the rule as applied in general).
Thank you, that helped to clear things up.
And, just to make sure that there’s no more assumption traps (i.e. where we each assume that something mutually exclusive is obvious) I will describe my understanding of that situation (correct me if I’m wrong):
A person finds a romantic partner to which they are attracted. He (or she) compliments said partner on some aspect which he (or she) finds attractive only due to the halo effect; on the basis of these compliments, both partners enter a long-term romantic relationship. The person later improves their self-awareness, and realises that the earlier compliments were only due to the halo effect; admitting so then carries a social penalty.
In that case, I would agree; however, improved self-knowledge earlier in the process can head off the problem entirely. So it’s not penalizing self-knowledge; it’s rather penalizing the earlier lack of self-knowledge.
Yes, exactly. Sorry, I didn’t quite catch that you thought we were talking about a general rule or I would have cleared this up earlier.
I don’t think so. It’s penalizing becoming self-aware. After all, if the person never became self-aware, she would never incur the penalty.
And, similarly, if a person never hits the ground, he never incurs any injury from falling. If he becomes self-aware quickly enough, then he takes comparatively minor social damage—as a man who falls and quickly hits the ground may only twist an ankle. If he becomes self-aware only after twenty years of marriage, then he potentially takes severe social damage; as a man who falls from a skyscraper, take severe damage when he hits the ground.
So, yes, I can see why you make that statement; it is a reasonable statement, but I think it places the emphasis on the wrong part of the fall.