We value saving lives who have a high expected time until death, so yes, we value saving nine-year-olds more than ninety-year-olds. This would presumably become reversed if the child had 1/10th the expected time until death as the old man.
At least to the extent that this preference comes from deliberative knowledge, rather than free-floating norms about the value of children, or instinct.
Yes, to that extent. The amount that we value the child’s life does start with an advantage against the amount we value the old man’s life, which is why I chose a drastic ratio.
At least to the extent that this preference comes from deliberative knowledge, rather than free-floating norms about the value of children, or instinct.
Yes, to that extent. The amount that we value the child’s life does start with an advantage against the amount we value the old man’s life, which is why I chose a drastic ratio.