The LCPW is the one where your argument fails while mine works: suppose only the worlds where you live matter to you, so you happily suicide if you lose. So any egoist believing the MWI should use quantum immortality early and often if he/she is rational.
An egoist is generally someone who cares only about their own self-interest; that should be distinct from someone who has a utility function over experiences, not over outcomes.
But a rational agent with a utility function only over experiences would commit quantum suicide if we also assume there’s minimal risk of the suicide attempt failing/ the lottery not really being random, etc.
In short, it’s an argument that works in the LCPW but not in the world we actually live in, so the absence of suiciding rationalists doesn’t imply MWI is a belief-in-belief.
The LCPW is the one where your argument fails while mine works: suppose only the worlds where you live matter to you, so you happily suicide if you lose. So any egoist believing the MWI should use quantum immortality early and often if he/she is rational.
An egoist is generally someone who cares only about their own self-interest; that should be distinct from someone who has a utility function over experiences, not over outcomes.
But a rational agent with a utility function only over experiences would commit quantum suicide if we also assume there’s minimal risk of the suicide attempt failing/ the lottery not really being random, etc.
In short, it’s an argument that works in the LCPW but not in the world we actually live in, so the absence of suiciding rationalists doesn’t imply MWI is a belief-in-belief.