All ethical theories try to approximate the “true ought,”
Do they? If we’re acknowledging the evolutionary nature of moral intuition, surely some theories recognize and accept that my intuition is going to be different from Bob’s intuition. It doesn’t feel like “true ought” once we’re talking about differences between my true ought and Bob’s true ought.
Separately, the claim that utilitarianism is “vulnerable to bad world-modeling and motivated bullshit” has always felt unfair to me. I challenge anyone to say with a straight face that other ethical systems aren’t vulnerable to motivated bullshit. To pick a real but hopefully low-controversy example, halakha is full of bullshit interpretations of seemingly clear deontological rules.
Do they? If we’re acknowledging the evolutionary nature of moral intuition, surely some theories recognize and accept that my intuition is going to be different from Bob’s intuition. It doesn’t feel like “true ought” once we’re talking about differences between my true ought and Bob’s true ought.
Separately, the claim that utilitarianism is “vulnerable to bad world-modeling and motivated bullshit” has always felt unfair to me. I challenge anyone to say with a straight face that other ethical systems aren’t vulnerable to motivated bullshit. To pick a real but hopefully low-controversy example, halakha is full of bullshit interpretations of seemingly clear deontological rules.