On one view (the dominant one, as I understand it[6]), both verdict-level intuitions and independently plausible principles defeasibly and directly justify each other. This approach at least doesn’t treat verdict-level intuitions as bedrock, or as infallible. But this doesn’t avoid the core problem. We’re still saying these intuitions provide direct justification, so my critique above applies, even on a coherentist account of justification.
Another argument against this form of reflective equilibrium is that it seems to imply anti-realism about normative decision theory, given differing intuitions between people. I think this is plausible but not likely, so it seems bad to bake it into our methodology of doing decision theory.
(I was actually not previous aware that “reflective equilibrium” had this kind of structure, and naively interpreted it to mean just “reflect until you reach equilibrium” or “think until you stop changing your mind”.)
Another argument against this form of reflective equilibrium is that it seems to imply anti-realism about normative decision theory, given differing intuitions between people. I think this is plausible but not likely, so it seems bad to bake it into our methodology of doing decision theory.
(I was actually not previous aware that “reflective equilibrium” had this kind of structure, and naively interpreted it to mean just “reflect until you reach equilibrium” or “think until you stop changing your mind”.)