If some things are concious and some aren’t, then there has to be some rule differentiating the two, which give a complexity penalty.
If some things are computers and some aren’t, then there has to be some rule differentiating the two, which gives a complexity penalty. Thus by occam’s razor everything is likely a computer. Does this argument work?
My position: consciousness is in the map, not the territory.
Suppose a taoist claims not to have any preferences. Should you be concerned about them?
Maybe, because humans often lie or have inaccurate self-knowledge.
If some things are computers and some aren’t, then there has to be some rule differentiating the two, which gives a complexity penalty. Thus by occam’s razor everything is likely a computer. Does this argument work?
Well, you can turn some unusual things into computers—billiard tables, model trains and the game of life are all turning-complete.
But I do have a good understanding of what a computer is. Perhaps my occam’s razor based prior is that everything is a computer, but then I observe that I can’t use most objects to compute anything, so I update and conclude that most things aren’t computers.
Similarly, I can observe that most things do not have emotions, or preferences, or agency, or self-awareness. I can put a mirror in front of an animal and conclude that most animals aren’t self-aware.
But is there any test I can perform to determine whether something experiences qualia?
Maybe, because humans often lie or have inaccurate self-knowledge.
Ok, suppose neuroscientists find a person who has not preferences for solid scientific reasons—perhaps the prefrontal cortex has been lesioned, or maybe they have no dopamine in their brain. Should you care about this person?
If some things are computers and some aren’t, then there has to be some rule differentiating the two, which gives a complexity penalty. Thus by occam’s razor everything is likely a computer. Does this argument work?
My position: consciousness is in the map, not the territory.
Maybe, because humans often lie or have inaccurate self-knowledge.
Well, you can turn some unusual things into computers—billiard tables, model trains and the game of life are all turning-complete.
But I do have a good understanding of what a computer is. Perhaps my occam’s razor based prior is that everything is a computer, but then I observe that I can’t use most objects to compute anything, so I update and conclude that most things aren’t computers.
Similarly, I can observe that most things do not have emotions, or preferences, or agency, or self-awareness. I can put a mirror in front of an animal and conclude that most animals aren’t self-aware.
But is there any test I can perform to determine whether something experiences qualia?
Ok, suppose neuroscientists find a person who has not preferences for solid scientific reasons—perhaps the prefrontal cortex has been lesioned, or maybe they have no dopamine in their brain. Should you care about this person?