Open-Minded Updatelessness doesn’t push back on this fundamental trade-off. Instead, given the trade-off persists, it explores which kinds and shapes of partial commitments seem more robustly net-positive from the perspective of our current game-theoretic knowledge (that is, our current prior)
I would distinguish between two cases:
We’re aware of specific reasons why continuing to follow an OMU policy could be harmful (e.g., specific reasons other agents might punish us for doing so). In such cases, if those hypotheses have high-enough weight, OMU as a normative criterion can itself recommend not continuing to follow the OMU policy. So, in this sense I agree with the quote, but this doesn’t undermine OMU as a normative criterion.
We’re not aware of any specific reasons why continuing to follow the OMU policy could be harmful. In that case, it seems arbitrary to form beliefs according to which it’s net-negative to continue following OMU, and so it seems reasonable to continue following OMU (I’m not sure what else to do).
I would distinguish between two cases:
We’re aware of specific reasons why continuing to follow an OMU policy could be harmful (e.g., specific reasons other agents might punish us for doing so). In such cases, if those hypotheses have high-enough weight, OMU as a normative criterion can itself recommend not continuing to follow the OMU policy. So, in this sense I agree with the quote, but this doesn’t undermine OMU as a normative criterion.
We’re not aware of any specific reasons why continuing to follow the OMU policy could be harmful. In that case, it seems arbitrary to form beliefs according to which it’s net-negative to continue following OMU, and so it seems reasonable to continue following OMU (I’m not sure what else to do).
Sorry for only now commenting...