One thing which I find interesting about many 2-system models, including this one, is that the “lower” system (the subconscious, the elephant, system 1, etc) is often not doing its calculations entirely or even primarily in the brain (though this is only rarely clarified). The original system 1 / system 2 distinction was certainly referring to brain structures—“hot” and “cool” subsystems of the brain. But, in terms of Freud’s earlier 2-system model, the conscious vs unconscious, Carl Jung found it useful to speak of the “collective unconsciousness” as being an element of the unconscious mind. I think Jung’s idea is actually a good way of cutting things up.
It’s very obvious in the example in this post with the baby nursing: there doesn’t need to be a calculation anywhere in the baby which figures out that wanting mama in the evening reduces the chances of more siblings. There probably isn’t a calculation like that.
So, in many cases, the “player” is indeed lovecraftian and inhuman: it is Azathoth, the blind watchmaker. Evolution selects the genes which shape the personality type.
Obviously, not all of the “player” computations you’re referring to occur at the evolutionary level. But, I think the boundary is a fluid one. It is not always easy to cleanly define whether an adaptation is evolutionary or within-lifetime; many things are a complicated combination of both (see the discussion of the Baldwin effect in The Plausibility of Life.)
I think there are other lovecraftian gods holding some of the strings as well. Many habits and norms are shaped by economic incentives (Mammon, god of the market place). This is a case where more of the computation may be in a person’s head, but, not all of it. The market itself does a lot of computation, and people can pick up machiavellian business norms without having a generator of machiavellianness inside their skull, or blindly ape personality-ish things contributing to reasonable spending habits without directly calculating such things, etc.
We can explain the words of politicians better by thinking they’re optimized for political advantage rather than truth, and much of that optimization may be in the brain of the politician. But, the political machine also can select for politicians who honestly believe the politically-advantageous things. In an elephant/rider model, the computation of the elephant may be outside the politician.
One thing which I find interesting about many 2-system models, including this one, is that the “lower” system (the subconscious, the elephant, system 1, etc) is often not doing its calculations entirely or even primarily in the brain (though this is only rarely clarified). The original system 1 / system 2 distinction was certainly referring to brain structures—“hot” and “cool” subsystems of the brain. But, in terms of Freud’s earlier 2-system model, the conscious vs unconscious, Carl Jung found it useful to speak of the “collective unconsciousness” as being an element of the unconscious mind. I think Jung’s idea is actually a good way of cutting things up.
It’s very obvious in the example in this post with the baby nursing: there doesn’t need to be a calculation anywhere in the baby which figures out that wanting mama in the evening reduces the chances of more siblings. There probably isn’t a calculation like that.
So, in many cases, the “player” is indeed lovecraftian and inhuman: it is Azathoth, the blind watchmaker. Evolution selects the genes which shape the personality type.
Obviously, not all of the “player” computations you’re referring to occur at the evolutionary level. But, I think the boundary is a fluid one. It is not always easy to cleanly define whether an adaptation is evolutionary or within-lifetime; many things are a complicated combination of both (see the discussion of the Baldwin effect in The Plausibility of Life.)
I think there are other lovecraftian gods holding some of the strings as well. Many habits and norms are shaped by economic incentives (Mammon, god of the market place). This is a case where more of the computation may be in a person’s head, but, not all of it. The market itself does a lot of computation, and people can pick up machiavellian business norms without having a generator of machiavellianness inside their skull, or blindly ape personality-ish things contributing to reasonable spending habits without directly calculating such things, etc.
We can explain the words of politicians better by thinking they’re optimized for political advantage rather than truth, and much of that optimization may be in the brain of the politician. But, the political machine also can select for politicians who honestly believe the politically-advantageous things. In an elephant/rider model, the computation of the elephant may be outside the politician.