First of all, there isn’t anything that’s “of the the same type as an ought” except an ought. So no, you’re not getting any oughts, nor anything “of the same type”. It’s “is” all the way through, here.
More to the point, I think you’re missing a critical layer of abstraction/indirection: namely, that what you can predict, via the adaptive/game-theoretic perspective, isn’t “what oughts are likely to be acknowledged”, but “what oughts will the agent act as if it follows”. Those will usually not be the same as what oughts the agent acknowledges, or finds persuasive, etc.
This is related to “Adaptation-Executers, Not Fitness-Maximizers”. An agent who commits suicide is unlikely (though not entirely unable!) to propagate, this is true, but who says that an agent who doesn’t commit suicide can’t believe that suicide is good, can’t advocate for suicide, etc.? In fact, such agents—actual people, alive today—can, and do, all these things!
First of all, there isn’t anything that’s “of the the same type as an ought” except an ought. So no, you’re not getting any oughts, nor anything “of the same type”. It’s “is” all the way through, here.
More to the point, I think you’re missing a critical layer of abstraction/indirection: namely, that what you can predict, via the adaptive/game-theoretic perspective, isn’t “what oughts are likely to be acknowledged”, but “what oughts will the agent act as if it follows”. Those will usually not be the same as what oughts the agent acknowledges, or finds persuasive, etc.
This is related to “Adaptation-Executers, Not Fitness-Maximizers”. An agent who commits suicide is unlikely (though not entirely unable!) to propagate, this is true, but who says that an agent who doesn’t commit suicide can’t believe that suicide is good, can’t advocate for suicide, etc.? In fact, such agents—actual people, alive today—can, and do, all these things!